Bjorn Olav Jalborg 8d7a272fdd loop+loopout: validate hash of swap invoice ... This commit fixes a possible exploit by the loop server, where - in a loop out - the server could claim money off-chain, without publishing an on-chain swap htlc. The server could do this by responding with a regular invoice, whose hash is different than the hash in the NewLoopOutSwap request. To prevent the exploit, we validate that the hash of the swap invoice is equal to the hash the client generated.		2019-07-31 11:01:42 +02:00
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fees.go	loop+loopout: validate hash of swap invoice	2019-07-31 11:01:42 +02:00
htlc.go	swap: fix htlc address generation	2019-05-03 10:52:23 +02:00
keychain.go	utils: remove utils package in favor of new swap package	2019-03-06 20:34:00 -08:00
net.go	utils: remove utils package in favor of new swap package	2019-03-06 20:34:00 -08:00
tx.go	utils: remove utils package in favor of new swap package	2019-03-06 20:34:00 -08:00