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efad3506a8 Merge #906: Use modified divsteps with initial delta=1/2 for constant-time cc2c09e3a7 Merge #918: Clean up configuration in gen_context 07067967ee add ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS to basic_config.h a3aa2628c7 gen_context: Don't include basic-config.h be0609fd54 Add unit tests for edge cases with delta=1/2 variant of divsteps cd393ce228 Optimization: only do 59 hddivsteps per iteration instead of 62 277b224b6a Use modified divsteps with initial delta=1/2 for constant-time 376ca366db Fix typo in explanation 1e5d50fa93 Merge #889: fix uninitialized read in tests c083cc6e52 Merge #903: Make argument of fe_normalizes_to_zero{_var} const 6e898534ff Merge #907: changed import to use brackets <> for openssl 4504472269 changed import to use brackets <> for openssl as they are not local to the project 26de4dfeb1 Merge #831: Safegcd inverses, drop Jacobi symbols, remove libgmp 23c3fb629b Make argument of fe_normalizes_to_zero{_var} const 24ad04fc06 Make scalar_inverse{,_var} benchmark scale with SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS ebc1af700f Optimization: track f,g limb count and pass to new variable-time update_fg_var b306935ac1 Optimization: use formulas instead of lookup tables for cancelling g bits 9164a1b658 Optimization: special-case zero modulus limbs in modinv64 1f233b3fa0 Remove num/gmp support 20448b8d09 Remove unused Jacobi symbol support 5437e7bdfb Remove unused scalar_sqr aa9cc52180 Improve field/scalar inverse tests 1e0e885c8a Make field/scalar code use the new modinv modules for inverses 436281afdc Move secp256k1_fe_inverse{_var} to per-impl files aa404d53be Move secp256k1_scalar_{inverse{_var},is_even} to per-impl files 08d54964e5 Improve bounds checks in modinv modules 151aac00d3 Add tests for modinv modules d8a92fcc4c Add extensive comments on the safegcd algorithm and implementation 8e415acba2 Add safegcd based modular inverse modules de0a643c3d Add secp256k1_ctz{32,64}_var functions 4c3ba88c3a Merge #901: ci: Switch all Linux builds to Debian and more improvements 9361f360bb ci: Select number of parallel make jobs depending on CI environment 28eccdf806 ci: Split output of logs into multiple sections c7f754fe4d ci: Run PRs on merge result instead of on the source branch b994a8be3c ci: Print information about binaries using "file" f24e122d13 ci: Switch all Linux builds to Debian ebdba03cb5 Merge #891: build: Add workaround for automake 1.13 and older 3a8b47bc6d Merge #894: ctime_test: move context randomization test to the end 7d3497cdc4 ctime_test: move context randomization test to the end 99a1cfec17 print warnings for conditional-uninitialized 3d2cf6c5bd initialize variable in tests f329bba244 build: Add workaround for automake 1.13 and older 24d1656c32 Merge #882: Use bit ops instead of int mult for constant-time logic in gej_add_ge e491d06b98 Use bit ops instead of int mult for constant-time logic in gej_add_ge f8c0b57e6b Merge #864: Add support for Cirrus CI cc2a5451dc ci: Refactor Nix shell files 2480e55c8f ci: Remove support for Travis CI 2b359f1c1d ci: Enable simple cache for brewing valgrind on macOS 8c02e465c5 ci: Add support for Cirrus CI 659d0d4798 Merge #880: Add parens around ROUND_TO_ALIGN's parameter. b6f649889a Add parens around ROUND_TO_ALIGN's parameter. This makes the macro robust against a hypothetical ROUND_TO_ALIGN(foo ? sizeA : size B) invocation. a4abaab793 Merge #877: Add missing secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var decl. 5671e5f3fd Merge #874: Remove underscores from header defs. db726782fa Merge #878: Remove unused secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var b732701faa Merge #875: Avoid casting (void**) values. 75d2ae149e Remove unused secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var 482e4a9cfc Add missing secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var decl. 2730618604 Avoid casting (void**) values. Replaced with an expression that only casts (void*) values. fb390c5299 Remove underscores from header defs. This makes them consistent with other files and avoids reserved identifiers. f2d9aeae6d Merge #862: Autoconf improvements 328aaef22a Merge #845: Extract the secret key from a keypair 3c15130709 Improve CC_FOR_BUILD detection 47802a4762 Restructure and tidy configure.ac 252c19dfc6 Ask brew for valgrind include path 8c727b9087 Merge #860: fixed trivial typo b7bc3a4aaa fixed typo 33cb3c2b1f Add secret key extraction from keypair to constant time tests 36d9dc1e8e Add seckey extraction from keypair to the extrakeys tests fc96aa73f5 Add a function to extract the secretkey from a keypair 98dac87839 Merge #858: Fix insecure links 07aa4c70ff Fix insecure links b61f9da54e Merge #857: docs: fix simple typo, dependecy -> dependency 18aadf9d28 docs: fix simple typo, dependecy -> dependency 2d9e7175c6 Merge #852: Add sage script for generating scalar_split_lambda constants dc6e5c3a5c Merge #854: Rename msg32 to msghash32 in ecdsa_sign/verify and add explanation 6e85d675aa Rename tweak to tweak32 in public API f587f04e35 Rename msg32 to msghash32 in ecdsa_sign/verify and add explanation 329a2e0a3f sage: Add script for generating scalar_split_lambda constants 8f0c6f1545 Merge #851: make test count iteration configurable by environment variable f4fa8d226a forbid a test iteration of 0 or less f554dfc708 sage: Reorganize files 3a106966aa Merge #849: Convert Sage code to Python 3 (as used by Sage >= 9) 13c88efed0 Convert Sage code to Python 3 (as used by Sage >= 9) 0ce4554881 make test count iteration configurable by environment variable 9e5939d284 Merge #835: Don't use reserved identifiers memczero and benchmark_verify_t d0a83f7328 Merge #839: Prevent arithmetic on NULL pointer if the scratch space is too small 903b16aa6c Merge #840: Return NULL early in context_preallocated_create if flags invalid 1f4dd03838 Typedef (u)int128_t only when they're not provided by the compiler ebfa2058e9 Return NULL early in context_preallocated_create if flags invalid 29a299e373 Run the undefined behaviour sanitizer on Travis 7506e064d7 Prevent arithmetic on NULL pointer if the scratch space is too small e89278f211 Don't use reserved identifiers memczero and benchmark_verify_t git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1 git-subtree-split: efad3506a8937162e8010f5839fdf3771dfcf516
593 lines
27 KiB
C
593 lines
27 KiB
C
/***********************************************************************
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* Copyright (c) 2020 Peter Dettman *
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* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
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* file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
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**********************************************************************/
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#ifndef SECP256K1_MODINV64_IMPL_H
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#define SECP256K1_MODINV64_IMPL_H
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#include "modinv64.h"
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#include "util.h"
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/* This file implements modular inversion based on the paper "Fast constant-time gcd computation and
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* modular inversion" by Daniel J. Bernstein and Bo-Yin Yang.
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*
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* For an explanation of the algorithm, see doc/safegcd_implementation.md. This file contains an
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* implementation for N=62, using 62-bit signed limbs represented as int64_t.
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*/
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#ifdef VERIFY
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/* Helper function to compute the absolute value of an int64_t.
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* (we don't use abs/labs/llabs as it depends on the int sizes). */
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static int64_t secp256k1_modinv64_abs(int64_t v) {
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VERIFY_CHECK(v > INT64_MIN);
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if (v < 0) return -v;
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return v;
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}
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static const secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE = {{1}};
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/* Compute a*factor and put it in r. All but the top limb in r will be in range [0,2^62). */
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static void secp256k1_modinv64_mul_62(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *r, const secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *a, int alen, int64_t factor) {
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const int64_t M62 = (int64_t)(UINT64_MAX >> 2);
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int128_t c = 0;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
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if (i < alen) c += (int128_t)a->v[i] * factor;
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r->v[i] = (int64_t)c & M62; c >>= 62;
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}
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if (4 < alen) c += (int128_t)a->v[4] * factor;
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VERIFY_CHECK(c == (int64_t)c);
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r->v[4] = (int64_t)c;
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}
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/* Return -1 for a<b*factor, 0 for a==b*factor, 1 for a>b*factor. A has alen limbs; b has 5. */
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static int secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(const secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *a, int alen, const secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *b, int64_t factor) {
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int i;
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secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 am, bm;
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secp256k1_modinv64_mul_62(&am, a, alen, 1); /* Normalize all but the top limb of a. */
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secp256k1_modinv64_mul_62(&bm, b, 5, factor);
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for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
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/* Verify that all but the top limb of a and b are normalized. */
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VERIFY_CHECK(am.v[i] >> 62 == 0);
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VERIFY_CHECK(bm.v[i] >> 62 == 0);
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}
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for (i = 4; i >= 0; --i) {
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if (am.v[i] < bm.v[i]) return -1;
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if (am.v[i] > bm.v[i]) return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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/* Take as input a signed62 number in range (-2*modulus,modulus), and add a multiple of the modulus
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* to it to bring it to range [0,modulus). If sign < 0, the input will also be negated in the
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* process. The input must have limbs in range (-2^62,2^62). The output will have limbs in range
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* [0,2^62). */
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static void secp256k1_modinv64_normalize_62(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *r, int64_t sign, const secp256k1_modinv64_modinfo *modinfo) {
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const int64_t M62 = (int64_t)(UINT64_MAX >> 2);
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int64_t r0 = r->v[0], r1 = r->v[1], r2 = r->v[2], r3 = r->v[3], r4 = r->v[4];
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int64_t cond_add, cond_negate;
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#ifdef VERIFY
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/* Verify that all limbs are in range (-2^62,2^62). */
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
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VERIFY_CHECK(r->v[i] >= -M62);
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VERIFY_CHECK(r->v[i] <= M62);
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}
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VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(r, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -2) > 0); /* r > -2*modulus */
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VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(r, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* r < modulus */
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#endif
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/* In a first step, add the modulus if the input is negative, and then negate if requested.
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* This brings r from range (-2*modulus,modulus) to range (-modulus,modulus). As all input
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* limbs are in range (-2^62,2^62), this cannot overflow an int64_t. Note that the right
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* shifts below are signed sign-extending shifts (see assumptions.h for tests that that is
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* indeed the behavior of the right shift operator). */
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cond_add = r4 >> 63;
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r0 += modinfo->modulus.v[0] & cond_add;
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r1 += modinfo->modulus.v[1] & cond_add;
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r2 += modinfo->modulus.v[2] & cond_add;
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r3 += modinfo->modulus.v[3] & cond_add;
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r4 += modinfo->modulus.v[4] & cond_add;
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cond_negate = sign >> 63;
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r0 = (r0 ^ cond_negate) - cond_negate;
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r1 = (r1 ^ cond_negate) - cond_negate;
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r2 = (r2 ^ cond_negate) - cond_negate;
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r3 = (r3 ^ cond_negate) - cond_negate;
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r4 = (r4 ^ cond_negate) - cond_negate;
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/* Propagate the top bits, to bring limbs back to range (-2^62,2^62). */
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r1 += r0 >> 62; r0 &= M62;
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r2 += r1 >> 62; r1 &= M62;
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r3 += r2 >> 62; r2 &= M62;
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r4 += r3 >> 62; r3 &= M62;
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/* In a second step add the modulus again if the result is still negative, bringing
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* r to range [0,modulus). */
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cond_add = r4 >> 63;
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r0 += modinfo->modulus.v[0] & cond_add;
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r1 += modinfo->modulus.v[1] & cond_add;
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r2 += modinfo->modulus.v[2] & cond_add;
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r3 += modinfo->modulus.v[3] & cond_add;
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r4 += modinfo->modulus.v[4] & cond_add;
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/* And propagate again. */
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r1 += r0 >> 62; r0 &= M62;
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r2 += r1 >> 62; r1 &= M62;
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r3 += r2 >> 62; r2 &= M62;
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r4 += r3 >> 62; r3 &= M62;
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r->v[0] = r0;
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r->v[1] = r1;
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r->v[2] = r2;
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r->v[3] = r3;
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r->v[4] = r4;
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#ifdef VERIFY
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VERIFY_CHECK(r0 >> 62 == 0);
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VERIFY_CHECK(r1 >> 62 == 0);
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VERIFY_CHECK(r2 >> 62 == 0);
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VERIFY_CHECK(r3 >> 62 == 0);
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VERIFY_CHECK(r4 >> 62 == 0);
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VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(r, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 0) >= 0); /* r >= 0 */
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VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(r, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* r < modulus */
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#endif
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}
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/* Data type for transition matrices (see section 3 of explanation).
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*
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* t = [ u v ]
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* [ q r ]
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*/
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typedef struct {
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int64_t u, v, q, r;
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} secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2;
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/* Compute the transition matrix and eta for 59 divsteps (where zeta=-(delta+1/2)).
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* Note that the transformation matrix is scaled by 2^62 and not 2^59.
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*
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* Input: zeta: initial zeta
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* f0: bottom limb of initial f
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* g0: bottom limb of initial g
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* Output: t: transition matrix
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* Return: final zeta
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*
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* Implements the divsteps_n_matrix function from the explanation.
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*/
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static int64_t secp256k1_modinv64_divsteps_59(int64_t zeta, uint64_t f0, uint64_t g0, secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 *t) {
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/* u,v,q,r are the elements of the transformation matrix being built up,
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* starting with the identity matrix times 8 (because the caller expects
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* a result scaled by 2^62). Semantically they are signed integers
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* in range [-2^62,2^62], but here represented as unsigned mod 2^64. This
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* permits left shifting (which is UB for negative numbers). The range
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* being inside [-2^63,2^63) means that casting to signed works correctly.
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*/
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uint64_t u = 8, v = 0, q = 0, r = 8;
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uint64_t c1, c2, f = f0, g = g0, x, y, z;
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int i;
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for (i = 3; i < 62; ++i) {
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VERIFY_CHECK((f & 1) == 1); /* f must always be odd */
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VERIFY_CHECK((u * f0 + v * g0) == f << i);
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VERIFY_CHECK((q * f0 + r * g0) == g << i);
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/* Compute conditional masks for (zeta < 0) and for (g & 1). */
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c1 = zeta >> 63;
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c2 = -(g & 1);
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/* Compute x,y,z, conditionally negated versions of f,u,v. */
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x = (f ^ c1) - c1;
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y = (u ^ c1) - c1;
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z = (v ^ c1) - c1;
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/* Conditionally add x,y,z to g,q,r. */
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g += x & c2;
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q += y & c2;
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r += z & c2;
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/* In what follows, c1 is a condition mask for (zeta < 0) and (g & 1). */
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c1 &= c2;
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/* Conditionally change zeta into -zeta-2 or zeta-1. */
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zeta = (zeta ^ c1) - 1;
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/* Conditionally add g,q,r to f,u,v. */
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f += g & c1;
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u += q & c1;
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v += r & c1;
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/* Shifts */
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g >>= 1;
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u <<= 1;
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v <<= 1;
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/* Bounds on zeta that follow from the bounds on iteration count (max 10*59 divsteps). */
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VERIFY_CHECK(zeta >= -591 && zeta <= 591);
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}
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/* Return data in t and return value. */
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t->u = (int64_t)u;
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t->v = (int64_t)v;
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t->q = (int64_t)q;
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t->r = (int64_t)r;
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/* The determinant of t must be a power of two. This guarantees that multiplication with t
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* does not change the gcd of f and g, apart from adding a power-of-2 factor to it (which
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* will be divided out again). As each divstep's individual matrix has determinant 2, the
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* aggregate of 59 of them will have determinant 2^59. Multiplying with the initial
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* 8*identity (which has determinant 2^6) means the overall outputs has determinant
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* 2^65. */
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VERIFY_CHECK((int128_t)t->u * t->r - (int128_t)t->v * t->q == ((int128_t)1) << 65);
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return zeta;
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}
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/* Compute the transition matrix and eta for 62 divsteps (variable time, eta=-delta).
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*
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* Input: eta: initial eta
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* f0: bottom limb of initial f
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* g0: bottom limb of initial g
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* Output: t: transition matrix
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* Return: final eta
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*
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* Implements the divsteps_n_matrix_var function from the explanation.
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*/
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static int64_t secp256k1_modinv64_divsteps_62_var(int64_t eta, uint64_t f0, uint64_t g0, secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 *t) {
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/* Transformation matrix; see comments in secp256k1_modinv64_divsteps_62. */
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uint64_t u = 1, v = 0, q = 0, r = 1;
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uint64_t f = f0, g = g0, m;
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uint32_t w;
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int i = 62, limit, zeros;
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for (;;) {
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/* Use a sentinel bit to count zeros only up to i. */
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zeros = secp256k1_ctz64_var(g | (UINT64_MAX << i));
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/* Perform zeros divsteps at once; they all just divide g by two. */
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g >>= zeros;
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u <<= zeros;
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v <<= zeros;
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eta -= zeros;
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i -= zeros;
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/* We're done once we've done 62 divsteps. */
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if (i == 0) break;
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VERIFY_CHECK((f & 1) == 1);
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VERIFY_CHECK((g & 1) == 1);
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VERIFY_CHECK((u * f0 + v * g0) == f << (62 - i));
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VERIFY_CHECK((q * f0 + r * g0) == g << (62 - i));
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/* Bounds on eta that follow from the bounds on iteration count (max 12*62 divsteps). */
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VERIFY_CHECK(eta >= -745 && eta <= 745);
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/* If eta is negative, negate it and replace f,g with g,-f. */
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if (eta < 0) {
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uint64_t tmp;
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eta = -eta;
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tmp = f; f = g; g = -tmp;
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tmp = u; u = q; q = -tmp;
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tmp = v; v = r; r = -tmp;
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/* Use a formula to cancel out up to 6 bits of g. Also, no more than i can be cancelled
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* out (as we'd be done before that point), and no more than eta+1 can be done as its
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* will flip again once that happens. */
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limit = ((int)eta + 1) > i ? i : ((int)eta + 1);
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VERIFY_CHECK(limit > 0 && limit <= 62);
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/* m is a mask for the bottom min(limit, 6) bits. */
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m = (UINT64_MAX >> (64 - limit)) & 63U;
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/* Find what multiple of f must be added to g to cancel its bottom min(limit, 6)
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* bits. */
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w = (f * g * (f * f - 2)) & m;
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} else {
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/* In this branch, use a simpler formula that only lets us cancel up to 4 bits of g, as
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* eta tends to be smaller here. */
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limit = ((int)eta + 1) > i ? i : ((int)eta + 1);
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VERIFY_CHECK(limit > 0 && limit <= 62);
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/* m is a mask for the bottom min(limit, 4) bits. */
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m = (UINT64_MAX >> (64 - limit)) & 15U;
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/* Find what multiple of f must be added to g to cancel its bottom min(limit, 4)
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* bits. */
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w = f + (((f + 1) & 4) << 1);
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w = (-w * g) & m;
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}
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g += f * w;
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q += u * w;
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r += v * w;
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VERIFY_CHECK((g & m) == 0);
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}
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/* Return data in t and return value. */
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t->u = (int64_t)u;
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t->v = (int64_t)v;
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t->q = (int64_t)q;
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t->r = (int64_t)r;
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/* The determinant of t must be a power of two. This guarantees that multiplication with t
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* does not change the gcd of f and g, apart from adding a power-of-2 factor to it (which
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* will be divided out again). As each divstep's individual matrix has determinant 2, the
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* aggregate of 62 of them will have determinant 2^62. */
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VERIFY_CHECK((int128_t)t->u * t->r - (int128_t)t->v * t->q == ((int128_t)1) << 62);
|
|
return eta;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute (t/2^62) * [d, e] mod modulus, where t is a transition matrix scaled by 2^62.
|
|
*
|
|
* On input and output, d and e are in range (-2*modulus,modulus). All output limbs will be in range
|
|
* (-2^62,2^62).
|
|
*
|
|
* This implements the update_de function from the explanation.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void secp256k1_modinv64_update_de_62(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *d, secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *e, const secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 *t, const secp256k1_modinv64_modinfo* modinfo) {
|
|
const int64_t M62 = (int64_t)(UINT64_MAX >> 2);
|
|
const int64_t d0 = d->v[0], d1 = d->v[1], d2 = d->v[2], d3 = d->v[3], d4 = d->v[4];
|
|
const int64_t e0 = e->v[0], e1 = e->v[1], e2 = e->v[2], e3 = e->v[3], e4 = e->v[4];
|
|
const int64_t u = t->u, v = t->v, q = t->q, r = t->r;
|
|
int64_t md, me, sd, se;
|
|
int128_t cd, ce;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(d, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -2) > 0); /* d > -2*modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(d, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* d < modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(e, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -2) > 0); /* e > -2*modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(e, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* e < modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK((secp256k1_modinv64_abs(u) + secp256k1_modinv64_abs(v)) >= 0); /* |u|+|v| doesn't overflow */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK((secp256k1_modinv64_abs(q) + secp256k1_modinv64_abs(r)) >= 0); /* |q|+|r| doesn't overflow */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK((secp256k1_modinv64_abs(u) + secp256k1_modinv64_abs(v)) <= M62 + 1); /* |u|+|v| <= 2^62 */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK((secp256k1_modinv64_abs(q) + secp256k1_modinv64_abs(r)) <= M62 + 1); /* |q|+|r| <= 2^62 */
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* [md,me] start as zero; plus [u,q] if d is negative; plus [v,r] if e is negative. */
|
|
sd = d4 >> 63;
|
|
se = e4 >> 63;
|
|
md = (u & sd) + (v & se);
|
|
me = (q & sd) + (r & se);
|
|
/* Begin computing t*[d,e]. */
|
|
cd = (int128_t)u * d0 + (int128_t)v * e0;
|
|
ce = (int128_t)q * d0 + (int128_t)r * e0;
|
|
/* Correct md,me so that t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me] has 62 zero bottom bits. */
|
|
md -= (modinfo->modulus_inv62 * (uint64_t)cd + md) & M62;
|
|
me -= (modinfo->modulus_inv62 * (uint64_t)ce + me) & M62;
|
|
/* Update the beginning of computation for t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me] now md,me are known. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[0] * md;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[0] * me;
|
|
/* Verify that the low 62 bits of the computation are indeed zero, and then throw them away. */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(((int64_t)cd & M62) == 0); cd >>= 62;
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(((int64_t)ce & M62) == 0); ce >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 1 of t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me], and store it as output limb 0 (= down shift). */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)u * d1 + (int128_t)v * e1;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)q * d1 + (int128_t)r * e1;
|
|
if (modinfo->modulus.v[1]) { /* Optimize for the case where limb of modulus is zero. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[1] * md;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[1] * me;
|
|
}
|
|
d->v[0] = (int64_t)cd & M62; cd >>= 62;
|
|
e->v[0] = (int64_t)ce & M62; ce >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 2 of t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me], and store it as output limb 1. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)u * d2 + (int128_t)v * e2;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)q * d2 + (int128_t)r * e2;
|
|
if (modinfo->modulus.v[2]) { /* Optimize for the case where limb of modulus is zero. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[2] * md;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[2] * me;
|
|
}
|
|
d->v[1] = (int64_t)cd & M62; cd >>= 62;
|
|
e->v[1] = (int64_t)ce & M62; ce >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 3 of t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me], and store it as output limb 2. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)u * d3 + (int128_t)v * e3;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)q * d3 + (int128_t)r * e3;
|
|
if (modinfo->modulus.v[3]) { /* Optimize for the case where limb of modulus is zero. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[3] * md;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[3] * me;
|
|
}
|
|
d->v[2] = (int64_t)cd & M62; cd >>= 62;
|
|
e->v[2] = (int64_t)ce & M62; ce >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 4 of t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me], and store it as output limb 3. */
|
|
cd += (int128_t)u * d4 + (int128_t)v * e4;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)q * d4 + (int128_t)r * e4;
|
|
cd += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[4] * md;
|
|
ce += (int128_t)modinfo->modulus.v[4] * me;
|
|
d->v[3] = (int64_t)cd & M62; cd >>= 62;
|
|
e->v[3] = (int64_t)ce & M62; ce >>= 62;
|
|
/* What remains is limb 5 of t*[d,e]+modulus*[md,me]; store it as output limb 4. */
|
|
d->v[4] = (int64_t)cd;
|
|
e->v[4] = (int64_t)ce;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(d, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -2) > 0); /* d > -2*modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(d, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* d < modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(e, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -2) > 0); /* e > -2*modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(e, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* e < modulus */
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute (t/2^62) * [f, g], where t is a transition matrix scaled by 2^62.
|
|
*
|
|
* This implements the update_fg function from the explanation.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void secp256k1_modinv64_update_fg_62(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *f, secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *g, const secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 *t) {
|
|
const int64_t M62 = (int64_t)(UINT64_MAX >> 2);
|
|
const int64_t f0 = f->v[0], f1 = f->v[1], f2 = f->v[2], f3 = f->v[3], f4 = f->v[4];
|
|
const int64_t g0 = g->v[0], g1 = g->v[1], g2 = g->v[2], g3 = g->v[3], g4 = g->v[4];
|
|
const int64_t u = t->u, v = t->v, q = t->q, r = t->r;
|
|
int128_t cf, cg;
|
|
/* Start computing t*[f,g]. */
|
|
cf = (int128_t)u * f0 + (int128_t)v * g0;
|
|
cg = (int128_t)q * f0 + (int128_t)r * g0;
|
|
/* Verify that the bottom 62 bits of the result are zero, and then throw them away. */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(((int64_t)cf & M62) == 0); cf >>= 62;
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(((int64_t)cg & M62) == 0); cg >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 1 of t*[f,g], and store it as output limb 0 (= down shift). */
|
|
cf += (int128_t)u * f1 + (int128_t)v * g1;
|
|
cg += (int128_t)q * f1 + (int128_t)r * g1;
|
|
f->v[0] = (int64_t)cf & M62; cf >>= 62;
|
|
g->v[0] = (int64_t)cg & M62; cg >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 2 of t*[f,g], and store it as output limb 1. */
|
|
cf += (int128_t)u * f2 + (int128_t)v * g2;
|
|
cg += (int128_t)q * f2 + (int128_t)r * g2;
|
|
f->v[1] = (int64_t)cf & M62; cf >>= 62;
|
|
g->v[1] = (int64_t)cg & M62; cg >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 3 of t*[f,g], and store it as output limb 2. */
|
|
cf += (int128_t)u * f3 + (int128_t)v * g3;
|
|
cg += (int128_t)q * f3 + (int128_t)r * g3;
|
|
f->v[2] = (int64_t)cf & M62; cf >>= 62;
|
|
g->v[2] = (int64_t)cg & M62; cg >>= 62;
|
|
/* Compute limb 4 of t*[f,g], and store it as output limb 3. */
|
|
cf += (int128_t)u * f4 + (int128_t)v * g4;
|
|
cg += (int128_t)q * f4 + (int128_t)r * g4;
|
|
f->v[3] = (int64_t)cf & M62; cf >>= 62;
|
|
g->v[3] = (int64_t)cg & M62; cg >>= 62;
|
|
/* What remains is limb 5 of t*[f,g]; store it as output limb 4. */
|
|
f->v[4] = (int64_t)cf;
|
|
g->v[4] = (int64_t)cg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute (t/2^62) * [f, g], where t is a transition matrix for 62 divsteps.
|
|
*
|
|
* Version that operates on a variable number of limbs in f and g.
|
|
*
|
|
* This implements the update_fg function from the explanation.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void secp256k1_modinv64_update_fg_62_var(int len, secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *f, secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *g, const secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 *t) {
|
|
const int64_t M62 = (int64_t)(UINT64_MAX >> 2);
|
|
const int64_t u = t->u, v = t->v, q = t->q, r = t->r;
|
|
int64_t fi, gi;
|
|
int128_t cf, cg;
|
|
int i;
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(len > 0);
|
|
/* Start computing t*[f,g]. */
|
|
fi = f->v[0];
|
|
gi = g->v[0];
|
|
cf = (int128_t)u * fi + (int128_t)v * gi;
|
|
cg = (int128_t)q * fi + (int128_t)r * gi;
|
|
/* Verify that the bottom 62 bits of the result are zero, and then throw them away. */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(((int64_t)cf & M62) == 0); cf >>= 62;
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(((int64_t)cg & M62) == 0); cg >>= 62;
|
|
/* Now iteratively compute limb i=1..len of t*[f,g], and store them in output limb i-1 (shifting
|
|
* down by 62 bits). */
|
|
for (i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
|
|
fi = f->v[i];
|
|
gi = g->v[i];
|
|
cf += (int128_t)u * fi + (int128_t)v * gi;
|
|
cg += (int128_t)q * fi + (int128_t)r * gi;
|
|
f->v[i - 1] = (int64_t)cf & M62; cf >>= 62;
|
|
g->v[i - 1] = (int64_t)cg & M62; cg >>= 62;
|
|
}
|
|
/* What remains is limb (len) of t*[f,g]; store it as output limb (len-1). */
|
|
f->v[len - 1] = (int64_t)cf;
|
|
g->v[len - 1] = (int64_t)cg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the inverse of x modulo modinfo->modulus, and replace x with it (constant time in x). */
|
|
static void secp256k1_modinv64(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *x, const secp256k1_modinv64_modinfo *modinfo) {
|
|
/* Start with d=0, e=1, f=modulus, g=x, zeta=-1. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 d = {{0, 0, 0, 0, 0}};
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 e = {{1, 0, 0, 0, 0}};
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 f = modinfo->modulus;
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 g = *x;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int64_t zeta = -1; /* zeta = -(delta+1/2); delta starts at 1/2. */
|
|
|
|
/* Do 10 iterations of 59 divsteps each = 590 divsteps. This suffices for 256-bit inputs. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
|
|
/* Compute transition matrix and new zeta after 59 divsteps. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 t;
|
|
zeta = secp256k1_modinv64_divsteps_59(zeta, f.v[0], g.v[0], &t);
|
|
/* Update d,e using that transition matrix. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_update_de_62(&d, &e, &t, modinfo);
|
|
/* Update f,g using that transition matrix. */
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* f > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) <= 0); /* f <= modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* g > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* g < modulus */
|
|
#endif
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_update_fg_62(&f, &g, &t);
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* f > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) <= 0); /* f <= modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* g > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* g < modulus */
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point sufficient iterations have been performed that g must have reached 0
|
|
* and (if g was not originally 0) f must now equal +/- GCD of the initial f, g
|
|
* values i.e. +/- 1, and d now contains +/- the modular inverse. */
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
/* g == 0 */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0);
|
|
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and |f|=modulus) */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, -1) == 0 ||
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 1) == 0 ||
|
|
(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(x, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&d, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
|
|
(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0 ||
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -1) == 0)));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Optionally negate d, normalize to [0,modulus), and return it. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_normalize_62(&d, f.v[4], modinfo);
|
|
*x = d;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the inverse of x modulo modinfo->modulus, and replace x with it (variable time). */
|
|
static void secp256k1_modinv64_var(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *x, const secp256k1_modinv64_modinfo *modinfo) {
|
|
/* Start with d=0, e=1, f=modulus, g=x, eta=-1. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 d = {{0, 0, 0, 0, 0}};
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 e = {{1, 0, 0, 0, 0}};
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 f = modinfo->modulus;
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 g = *x;
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
int j, len = 5;
|
|
int64_t eta = -1; /* eta = -delta; delta is initially 1 */
|
|
int64_t cond, fn, gn;
|
|
|
|
/* Do iterations of 62 divsteps each until g=0. */
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
/* Compute transition matrix and new eta after 62 divsteps. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_trans2x2 t;
|
|
eta = secp256k1_modinv64_divsteps_62_var(eta, f.v[0], g.v[0], &t);
|
|
/* Update d,e using that transition matrix. */
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_update_de_62(&d, &e, &t, modinfo);
|
|
/* Update f,g using that transition matrix. */
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* f > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) <= 0); /* f <= modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* g > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* g < modulus */
|
|
#endif
|
|
secp256k1_modinv64_update_fg_62_var(len, &f, &g, &t);
|
|
/* If the bottom limb of g is zero, there is a chance that g=0. */
|
|
if (g.v[0] == 0) {
|
|
cond = 0;
|
|
/* Check if the other limbs are also 0. */
|
|
for (j = 1; j < len; ++j) {
|
|
cond |= g.v[j];
|
|
}
|
|
/* If so, we're done. */
|
|
if (cond == 0) break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Determine if len>1 and limb (len-1) of both f and g is 0 or -1. */
|
|
fn = f.v[len - 1];
|
|
gn = g.v[len - 1];
|
|
cond = ((int64_t)len - 2) >> 63;
|
|
cond |= fn ^ (fn >> 63);
|
|
cond |= gn ^ (gn >> 63);
|
|
/* If so, reduce length, propagating the sign of f and g's top limb into the one below. */
|
|
if (cond == 0) {
|
|
f.v[len - 2] |= (uint64_t)fn << 62;
|
|
g.v[len - 2] |= (uint64_t)gn << 62;
|
|
--len;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(++i < 12); /* We should never need more than 12*62 = 744 divsteps */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* f > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) <= 0); /* f <= modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) > 0); /* g > -modulus */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) < 0); /* g < modulus */
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point g is 0 and (if g was not originally 0) f must now equal +/- GCD of
|
|
* the initial f, g values i.e. +/- 1, and d now contains +/- the modular inverse. */
|
|
#ifdef VERIFY
|
|
/* g == 0 */
|
|
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0);
|
|
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and |f|=modulus) */
|
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VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, -1) == 0 ||
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secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 1) == 0 ||
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(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(x, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
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secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&d, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
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(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0 ||
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secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) == 0)));
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#endif
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/* Optionally negate d, normalize to [0,modulus), and return it. */
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secp256k1_modinv64_normalize_62(&d, f.v[len - 1], modinfo);
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*x = d;
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}
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#endif /* SECP256K1_MODINV64_IMPL_H */
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