// Copyright (c) 2013-2019 The Elements Core developers // Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include // For elements serialization rules struct ElementsSetup : public TestingSetup { ElementsSetup() : TestingSetup("custom") {} }; BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(blind_tests, ElementsSetup) // TODO: Make deterministic blinding wrapper function, test caching more exactly BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(naive_blinding_test) { CKey key1; CKey key2; CKey keyDummy; // Any asset id will do CAsset bitcoinID(GetRandHash()); CAsset otherID(GetRandHash()); CAsset unblinded_id; uint256 asset_blind; CScript op_true(OP_TRUE); std::vector vDummy; unsigned char k1[32] = {1,2,3}; unsigned char k2[32] = {22,33,44}; unsigned char kDummy[32] = {133,144,155}; key1.Set(&k1[0], &k1[32], true); key2.Set(&k2[0], &k2[32], true); keyDummy.Set(&kDummy[0], &kDummy[32], true); CPubKey pubkey1 = key1.GetPubKey(); CPubKey pubkey2 = key2.GetPubKey(); CPubKey pubkeyDummy = keyDummy.GetPubKey(); uint256 blind3, blind4, blindDummy; std::vector inputs; CTxOut btc_oo(bitcoinID, 11, CScript()); CTxOut btc_ooo(bitcoinID, 111, CScript()); CTxOut other_fzz(otherID, 500, CScript()); CTxOut blind_ozz; // Will be computed later { inputs.clear(); inputs.push_back(btc_oo); inputs.push_back(btc_ooo); // Build a transaction that spends 2 unblinded coins (11, 111), and produces a single blinded one (100) and fee (22). CMutableTransaction tx3; tx3.vin.resize(2); tx3.vin[0].prevout.hash = ArithToUint256(1); tx3.vin[0].prevout.n = 0; tx3.vin[1].prevout.hash = ArithToUint256(2); tx3.vin[1].prevout.n = 0; tx3.vout.resize(0); tx3.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 100, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); // Fee outputs are blank scriptpubkeys, and unblinded value/asset tx3.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 22, CScript())); BOOST_CHECK(VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); // Malleate the output and check for correct handling of bad commitments // These will fail IsValid checks std::vector asset_copy(tx3.vout[0].nAsset.vchCommitment); std::vector value_copy(tx3.vout[0].nValue.vchCommitment); tx3.vout[0].nAsset.vchCommitment[0] = 122; BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); tx3.vout[0].nAsset.vchCommitment = asset_copy; tx3.vout[0].nValue.vchCommitment[0] = 122; BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); tx3.vout[0].nValue.vchCommitment = value_copy; // Make sure null values are handled correctly tx3.vout[0].nAsset.SetNull(); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); tx3.vout[0].nAsset.vchCommitment = asset_copy; tx3.vout[0].nValue.SetNull(); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); tx3.vout[0].nValue.vchCommitment = value_copy; // Bad nonce values will result in failure to deserialize tx3.vout[0].nNonce.SetNull(); BOOST_CHECK(VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); tx3.vout[0].nNonce.vchCommitment = tx3.vout[0].nValue.vchCommitment; BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); // Try to blind with a single non-fee output, which fails as its blinding factor ends up being zero. std::vector input_blinds; std::vector input_asset_blinds; std::vector input_assets; std::vector input_amounts; std::vector output_blinds; std::vector output_asset_blinds; std::vector output_pubkeys; input_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_asset_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_asset_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_assets.push_back(bitcoinID); input_assets.push_back(bitcoinID); input_amounts.push_back(11); input_amounts.push_back(111); output_pubkeys.push_back(pubkey1); output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey()); BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, tx3) == 0); // Add a dummy output. Must be unspendable since it's 0-valued. tx3.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 0, CScript() << OP_RETURN)); output_pubkeys.push_back(pubkeyDummy); BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, tx3) == 2); BOOST_CHECK(!tx3.vout[0].nValue.IsExplicit()); BOOST_CHECK(!tx3.vout[2].nValue.IsExplicit()); BOOST_CHECK(VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); CAmount unblinded_amount; BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx3.vout[0].nValue, tx3.vout[0].nAsset, tx3.vout[0].nNonce, op_true, tx3.witness.vtxoutwit[0].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind3, unblinded_id, asset_blind) == 0); // Saving unblinded_id and asset_blind for later since we need for input BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key1, tx3.vout[0].nValue, tx3.vout[0].nAsset, tx3.vout[0].nNonce, op_true, tx3.witness.vtxoutwit[0].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind3, unblinded_id, asset_blind) == 1); BOOST_CHECK(unblinded_amount == 100); BOOST_CHECK(unblinded_id == bitcoinID); CAsset temp_asset; uint256 temp_asset_blinder; BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(keyDummy, tx3.vout[2].nValue, tx3.vout[2].nAsset, tx3.vout[2].nNonce, CScript() << OP_RETURN, tx3.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blindDummy, temp_asset, temp_asset_blinder) == 1); BOOST_CHECK(unblinded_amount == 0); // Storing for next section BOOST_CHECK(tx3.vout[0].nValue.IsCommitment()); BOOST_CHECK(tx3.vout[0].nAsset.IsCommitment()); blind_ozz = tx3.vout[0]; tx3.vout[1].nValue = CConfidentialValue(tx3.vout[1].nValue.GetAmount() - 1); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx3), nullptr, false)); } { inputs.clear(); inputs.push_back(btc_ooo); inputs.push_back(blind_ozz); // Build a transactions that spends an unblinded (111) and blinded (100) coin, and produces only unblinded coins (impossible) CMutableTransaction tx4; tx4.vin.resize(2); tx4.vin[0].prevout.hash = ArithToUint256(2); tx4.vin[0].prevout.n = 0; tx4.vin[1].prevout.hash = ArithToUint256(3); tx4.vin[1].prevout.n = 0; tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 30, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 40, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 111+100-30-40, CScript())); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx4), nullptr, false)); // Spends a blinded coin with no blinded outputs to compensate. std::vector input_blinds; std::vector input_asset_blinds; std::vector input_assets; std::vector input_amounts; std::vector output_blinds; std::vector output_asset_blinds; std::vector output_pubkeys; input_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_blinds.push_back(blind3); input_asset_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_asset_blinds.push_back(asset_blind); input_amounts.push_back(111); input_amounts.push_back(100); input_assets.push_back(unblinded_id); input_assets.push_back(unblinded_id); output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey()); output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey()); output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey()); BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, tx4) == 0); // Blinds nothing } { inputs.clear(); inputs.push_back(btc_ooo); inputs.push_back(blind_ozz); // Build a transactions that spends an unblinded (111) and blinded (100) coin, and produces a blinded (30), unblinded (40), and blinded (50) coin and fee (91) CMutableTransaction tx4; tx4.vin.resize(2); tx4.vin[0].prevout.hash = ArithToUint256(2); tx4.vin[0].prevout.n = 0; tx4.vin[1].prevout.hash = ArithToUint256(3); tx4.vin[1].prevout.n = 0; tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 30, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 40, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 50, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); // Fee tx4.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 111+100-30-40-50, CScript())); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx4), nullptr, false)); // Spends a blinded coin with no blinded outputs to compensate. std::vector input_blinds; std::vector input_asset_blinds; std::vector input_assets; std::vector input_amounts; std::vector output_blinds; std::vector output_asset_blinds; std::vector output_pubkeys; input_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_blinds.push_back(blind3); input_asset_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_asset_blinds.push_back(asset_blind); input_amounts.push_back(111); input_amounts.push_back(100); input_assets.push_back(unblinded_id); input_assets.push_back(unblinded_id); output_pubkeys.push_back(pubkey2); output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey()); output_pubkeys.push_back(pubkey2); output_pubkeys.push_back(CPubKey()); BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, tx4) == 2); BOOST_CHECK(!tx4.vout[0].nValue.IsExplicit()); BOOST_CHECK(tx4.vout[1].nValue.IsExplicit()); BOOST_CHECK(!tx4.vout[2].nValue.IsExplicit()); // This one broken BOOST_CHECK(VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx4), nullptr, false)); CAmount unblinded_amount; CAsset asset_out; uint256 asset_blinder_out; BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key1, tx4.vout[0].nValue, tx4.vout[0].nAsset, tx4.vout[0].nNonce, op_true, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[0].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 0); BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx4.vout[0].nValue, tx4.vout[0].nAsset, tx4.vout[0].nNonce, op_true, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[0].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 1); BOOST_CHECK(unblinded_amount == 30); BOOST_CHECK(asset_out == unblinded_id); BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx4.vout[2].nValue, tx4.vout[2].nAsset, tx4.vout[2].nNonce, op_true, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 1); BOOST_CHECK(asset_out == unblinded_id); BOOST_CHECK(unblinded_amount == 50); // Commit to the wrong script in the rangeproof BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx4.vout[2].nValue, tx4.vout[2].nAsset, tx4.vout[2].nNonce, CScript() << OP_FALSE, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 0); // Make invalid public keys in nonce commitment, first of right size tx4.vout[2].nNonce.vchCommitment = std::vector(33, 0); tx4.vout[2].nNonce.vchCommitment[0] = 0x03; BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx4.vout[2].nValue, tx4.vout[2].nAsset, tx4.vout[2].nNonce, op_true, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 0); // Next, leading byte claiming to be 33 bytes in size tx4.vout[2].nNonce.vchCommitment.resize(1); BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx4.vout[2].nValue, tx4.vout[2].nAsset, tx4.vout[2].nNonce, op_true, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 0); // Last, blank nonce commitment tx4.vout[2].nNonce.vchCommitment.clear(); BOOST_CHECK(UnblindConfidentialPair(key2, tx4.vout[2].nValue, tx4.vout[2].nAsset, tx4.vout[2].nNonce, op_true, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof, unblinded_amount, blind4, asset_out, asset_blinder_out) == 0); tx4.vout[3].nValue = CConfidentialValue(tx4.vout[3].nValue.GetAmount() - 1); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx4), nullptr, false)); // Check wallet borromean-based rangeproof results against expected args size_t proof_size = DEFAULT_RANGEPROOF_SIZE; BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof.size(), proof_size); secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY); int exp = 0; int mantissa = 0; uint64_t min_value = 0; uint64_t max_value = 0; BOOST_CHECK(secp256k1_rangeproof_info(ctx, &exp, &mantissa, &min_value, &max_value, tx4.witness.vtxoutwit[2].vchRangeproof.data(), proof_size) == 1); BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exp, 0); BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(mantissa, 52); // 52 bit default BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(min_value, 1ULL); BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(max_value, 4503599627370496ULL); secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx); } { inputs.clear(); inputs.push_back(blind_ozz); inputs.push_back(other_fzz); // Spends 100 blinded bitcoin, 500 of unblinded "other" CMutableTransaction tx5; tx5.vin.resize(0); tx5.vout.resize(0); tx5.vin.push_back(CTxIn(COutPoint(ArithToUint256(3), 0))); tx5.vin.push_back(CTxIn(COutPoint(ArithToUint256(5), 0))); tx5.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 29, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx5.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 70, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx5.vout.push_back(CTxOut(otherID, 250, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); tx5.vout.push_back(CTxOut(otherID, 249, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); // Fees tx5.vout.push_back(CTxOut(bitcoinID, 1, CScript())); tx5.vout.push_back(CTxOut(otherID, 1, CScript())); // Blinds don't balance BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(tx5), nullptr, false)); // Blinding setup stuff std::vector input_blinds; std::vector input_asset_blinds; std::vector input_assets; std::vector input_amounts; std::vector output_blinds; std::vector output_asset_blinds; std::vector output_pubkeys; input_blinds.push_back(blind3); input_blinds.push_back(uint256()); // input_asset_blinds.push_back(asset_blind); input_asset_blinds.push_back(uint256()); input_amounts.push_back(100); input_amounts.push_back(500); input_assets.push_back(bitcoinID); input_assets.push_back(otherID); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 6; i++) { output_pubkeys.push_back(pubkey2); } CMutableTransaction txtemp(tx5); // No blinding keys for fees, bails out blinding nothing, still invalid due to imbalance BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, txtemp) == -1); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); // Last will be implied blank keys output_pubkeys.resize(4); // Blind transaction, verify amounts txtemp = tx5; BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, txtemp) == 4); BOOST_CHECK(VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); // Transaction may not have spendable 0-value output txtemp.vout.push_back(CTxOut(CAsset(), 0, CScript() << OP_TRUE)); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); // Create imbalance by removing fees, should still be able to blind txtemp = tx5; txtemp.vout.resize(5); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); txtemp.vout.resize(4); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(input_blinds, input_asset_blinds, input_assets, input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, txtemp) == 4); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); txtemp = tx5; // Remove other input, make surjection proof impossible for 2 "otherID" outputs std::vector t_input_blinds; std::vector t_input_asset_blinds; std::vector t_input_assets; std::vector t_input_amounts; t_input_blinds = input_blinds; t_input_asset_blinds = input_asset_blinds; t_input_assets = input_assets; t_input_amounts = input_amounts; txtemp.vin.resize(1); inputs.resize(1); t_input_blinds.resize(1); t_input_asset_blinds.resize(1); t_input_assets.resize(1); t_input_amounts.resize(1); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); BOOST_CHECK(BlindTransaction(t_input_blinds, t_input_asset_blinds, t_input_assets, t_input_amounts, output_blinds, output_asset_blinds, output_pubkeys, vDummy, vDummy, txtemp) == 2); BOOST_CHECK(!VerifyAmounts(inputs, CTransaction(txtemp), nullptr, false)); } } BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()