fa69e3a95c Remove unused MessageStartChars parameters from BlockManager methods (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Seems odd to expose these for mocking, when it is not needed.
Fix this by removing the the unused parameters and use the already existing member field instead.
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Empact:
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dergoegge:
utACK fa69e3a95c
Tree-SHA512: 7814e9560abba8d9c0926bcffc70f92e502d22f543af43671248f6fcd1433f35238553c0f05123fde6d8e0f80261af0ab0500927548115153bd68d57fe2da746
1b52d16d07 p2p: network-specific management of outbound connections (Martin Zumsande)
65cff00cee test: Add test for outbound protection by network (Martin Zumsande)
034f61f83b p2p: Protect extra full outbound peers by network (Martin Zumsande)
654d9bc276 p2p: Introduce data struct to track connection counts by network (Amiti Uttarwar)
Pull request description:
This is joint work with mzumsande.
This is a proposal to diversify outbound connections with respect to reachable networks. The existing logic evaluates peers for connection based purely on the frequency of available addresses in `AddrMan`. This PR adds logic to automatically connect to alternate reachable networks and adds eviction logic that protects one existing connection to each network.
For instance, if `AddrMan` is populated primarily with IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and only a handful of onion addresses, it is likely that we won't establish any automatic outbound connections to Tor, even if we're capable of doing so. For smaller networks like CJDNS, this is even more of an issue and often requires adding manual peers to ensure regularly being connected to the network.
Connecting to multiple networks improves resistance to eclipse attacks for individual nodes. It also benefits the entire p2p network by increasing partition resistance and privacy in general.
The automatic connections to alternate networks is done defensively, by first filling all outbound slots with random addresses (as in the status quo) and then adding additional peers from reachable networks the node is currently not connected to. This approach ensures that outbound slots are not left unfilled while attempting to connect to a network that may be unavailable due to a technical issue or misconfiguration that bitcoind cannot detect.
Once an additional peer is added and we have one more outbound connection than we want, outbound eviction ensures that peers are protected if they are the only ones for their network.
Manual connections are also taken into account: If a user already establishes manual connections to a trusted peer from a network, there is no longer a need to make extra efforts to ensure we also have an automatic connection to it (although this may of course happen by random selection).
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vasild:
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Tree-SHA512: 5616c038a5fbb868d4c46c5963cfd53e4599feee25db04b0e18da426d77d22e0994dc4e1da0b810f5b457f424ebbed3db1704f371aa6cad002b3565b20170ec0
If a peer is the only one of its network, protect it from eviction.
This improves the diversity of outbound connections with respect to
reachable networks.
Co-authored-by: Amiti Uttarwar <amiti@uttarwar.org>
Rather than using a bloom filter to track announced invs, simply allow
a peer to request any tx that entered the mempool prior to the last INV
message we sent them. This also obsoletes the UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY.
When processing `CMPCTBLOCK` message, at some moments
we can need to process cmpct block txns, since all messages
are handled by ProcessMessage, we call ProcessMessage
all over again. For this reason, it creates a function called
`ProcessCompactBlockTxns` to process it.
DataStream Serialize method has surprising behavior because it just serializes
raw bytes without a length prefix. When you serialize a string or vector, a
length prefix is serialized before the raw object contents so the object can be
unambiguously deserialized later. But DataStreams don't support deserializing
at all and just dump the raw bytes.
Having this inconsistency is not necessary and could be confusing (see
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27790#discussion_r1212315030) so this
PR just drops the DataStream::Serialize method.
I commented out a few new lines at the bottom of test/functional/p2p_ibd_txrelay.py
It tests that nodes process certain transactions, after IBD. These new assertions
from upstream are failing, but it may be because our IBD / tx sharing logic is different.
We should revisit this.
fb02a3cd1a p2p: Log addresses of stalling peers (Martin Zumsande)
Pull request description:
This was suggested in #27705 by ArmchairCryptologist.
It allows node operators that have the `-logips` option enabled to better identify potentially misbehaving peers and maybe ban them.
This is especially helpful in case of inbound peers for which (dis)connections aren't logged per default, so it's impossible to use the debug log to connect their `nodeId` to an address unless the very noisy `net` debugging is enabled.
In case of outbound peers for which the address is potentially logged when establishing the connection, this just adds some convenience.
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jamesob:
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0xB10C:
Untested ACK fb02a3cd1a
instagibbs:
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Tree-SHA512: 2080f794c715bd36143405828b4b0e1be859095caf8f8a0c20dd2a4b64d192d78fee0fa350a2bb7c39848718332c4dd4d8edb2cc8d22095b65afe710591f7ccb
A single outbound slot is required, so if the first two slots
are taken by inbound in-flights, the node will reject additional
unless they are coming from outbound.
This means in the case where a fast sybil peer is attempting to
stall out a node, a single high bandwidth outbound peer can
mitigate the attack.
This is a change in behavior so that if for some reason we request a block from a peer, we don't allow an unsolicited CMPCT_BLOCK announcement for that same block to cause a request for a full block from the uninvited peer (as some type of request is already outstanding from the original peer)
