Messy merge conflicts because this PR backported some ad-hoc stuff from
upstream while keeping a few things that upstream deleted. Hopefully
reviewing is easier than doing this in the first place, since ultimately
all I did was delete code from one side or another of the conflicts.
(Ok, I also changed some boost optional stuff to std::optional, and had
to patch up a test file for test framework changes.)
When reviewing the detailed crypto, bear in mind that taptweaks, like all
hashes are the kind of crypto that cannot be subtly wrong -- it will either
fail very hard or be correct. And we have independent implementations in
C++ and Python that cross-check each other, si it's unlikely to be the former.
This forward-ports the new Taproot sighash but does not fix a couple
22-blocked TODOs related to the MissingDataBehavior enum. Should be fixed
in a followup commit.
One nontrivial change I had to make was feeding the genesis hash to SignTransaction
(the "global" one in script/sign.cpp) so that it could correctly compute
the sighash at signing time.
This commit addresses #20809.
We add an additional 'error' property in the result of 'validateaddress' in case the address is not valid that gives a short description of why the address in invalid. We also change the error message returned by 'getaddressinfo' in case the address is invalid.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20832 (1/1)
ELEMENTS: Merge conflicts resolved based on d6c85c5620 (from 22.0 rebase)
Does the bare minimum to introduce Taproot wallet support with CT; just
adds a CPubKey blinding_pubkey to the taproot destination variant and
updates some visitors.
In future when we define blech32 we will need to make sure we are using
that encoding and using the pubkey.
5730a43703 test: Add functional test for AddrFetch connections (Martin Zumsande)
c34ad3309f net, rpc: Enable AddrFetch connections for functional testing (Martin Zumsande)
533500d907 p2p: Add timeout for AddrFetch peers (Martin Zumsande)
b6c5d1e450 p2p: AddrFetch - don't disconnect on self-announcements (Martin Zumsande)
Pull request description:
AddrFetch connections (old name: oneshots) are intended to be short-lived connections on which we ask a peer for addresses via `getaddr` and disconnect after receiving them.
This is done by disconnecting after receiving the first `addr`. However, it is no longer working as intended, because nowadays, the first `addr` a typical bitcoin core node sends is its self-announcement.
So we'll disconnect before the peer gets a chance to answer our `getaddr`.
I checked that this affects both `-seednode` peers specified manually, and DNS seeds when AddrFetch is used as a fallback if DNS doesn't work for us.
The current behavior of getting peers via AddrFetch when starting with an empty addrman would be to connect to the peer, receive its self-announcement and add it to addrman, disconnect, reconnect to the same peer again as a full outbound (no other addresses in addrman) and then receive more `addr`. This is silly and not in line with AddrFetch peer being intended to be short-lived peers.
Fix this by only disconnecting after receiving an `addr` message of size > 1.
[Edit] As per review discussion, this PR now also adds a timeout after which we disconnect if we haven't received any suitable `addr`, and a functional test.
ACKs for top commit:
amitiuttarwar:
reACK 5730a43703
naumenkogs:
ACK 5730a43703
jnewbery:
ACK 5730a43703
Tree-SHA512: 8a81234f37e827705138eb254223f7f3b3bf44a06cb02126fc7990b0d231b9bd8f07d38d185cc30d55bf35548a6fdc286b69602498d875b937e7c58332158bf9
fa80e10d94 test: Add feature_taproot.py --previous_release (MarcoFalke)
85ccffa266 test: move releases download incantation to README (Sjors Provoost)
29d6b1da2a test: previous releases: add v0.20.1 (Sjors Provoost)
Pull request description:
Disabling the new consensus code at runtime is fine, but potentially fragile and incomplete. Fix that by giving the option to run with a version that has been compiled without any taproot code.
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
tACK fa80e10
NelsonGaldeman:
tACK fa80e10d94
Tree-SHA512: 1a1feef823f08c05268759645a8974e1b2d39a024258f5e6acecbe25097aae3fa9302c27262978b40f1aa8e7b525b60c0047199010f2a5d6017dd6434b4066f0
4101ec9d2e doc: mention that we enforce port=0 in I2P (Vasil Dimov)
e0a2b390c1 addrman: reset I2P ports to 0 when loading from disk (Vasil Dimov)
41cda9d075 test: ensure I2P ports are handled as expected (Vasil Dimov)
4f432bd738 net: do not connect to I2P hosts on port!=0 (Vasil Dimov)
1f096f091e net: distinguish default port per network (Vasil Dimov)
aeac3bce3e net: change I2P seeds' ports to 0 (Vasil Dimov)
38f900290c net: change assumed I2P port to 0 (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
_This is an alternative to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514, inspired by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514#issuecomment-815049933. They are mutually exclusive. Just one of them should be merged._
Change assumed ports for I2P to 0 (instead of the default 8333) as this is closer to what actually happens underneath with SAM 3.1 (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514#issuecomment-812632520, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514#issuecomment-816564719).
Don't connect to I2P peers with advertised port != 0 (we don't specify a port to our SAM 3.1 proxy and it always connects to port = 0).
Note, this change:
* Keeps I2P addresses with port != 0 in addrman and relays them to others via P2P gossip. There may be non-bitcoin-core-22.0 peers using SAM 3.2 and for them such addresses may be useful.
* Silently refuses to connect to I2P hosts with port != 0. This is ok for automatically chosen peers from addrman. Not so ok for peers provided via `-addnode` or `-connect` - a user who specifies `foo.b32.i2p:1234` (non zero port) may wonder why "nothing is happening".
Fixes#21389
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 4101ec9d2e
jonatack:
re-ACK 4101ec9d2e per `git range-diff efff9c3 0b0ee03 4101ec9`, built with DDEBUG_ADDRMAN, did fairly extensive testing on mainnet both with and without a peers.dat / -dnsseeds=0 to test boostrapping.
Tree-SHA512: 0e3c019e1dc05e54f559275859d3450e0c735596d179e30b66811aad9d5b5fabe3dcc44571e8f7b99f9fe16453eee393d6e153454dd873b9ff14907d4e6354fe
2feec3ce31 net: don't bind on 0.0.0.0 if binds are restricted to Tor (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
The semantic of `-bind` is to restrict the binding only to some address.
If not specified, then the user does not care and we bind to `0.0.0.0`.
If specified then we should honor the restriction and bind only to the
specified address.
Before this change, if no `-bind` is given then we would bind to
`0.0.0.0:8333` and to `127.0.0.1:8334` (incoming Tor) which is ok -
the user does not care to restrict the binding.
However, if only `-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary
`-bind=`) then we would bind to `addr:port` _and_ to `0.0.0.0:8333` in
addition.
Change the above to not do the additional bind: if only
`-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary `-bind=`) then bind
to `addr:port` (only) and consider incoming connections to that as Tor
and do not advertise it. I.e. a Tor-only node.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 2feec3ce31
jonatack:
utACK 2feec3ce31 per `git diff a004833 2feec3c`
hebasto:
ACK 2feec3ce31, tested on Linux Mint 20.1 (x86_64):
Tree-SHA512: a04483af601706da928958b92dc560f9cfcc78ab0bb9d74414636eed1c6f29ed538ce1fb5a17d41ed82c9c9a45ca94899d0966e7ef93da809c9bcdcdb1d1f040
The semantic of `-bind` is to restrict the binding only to some address.
If not specified, then the user does not care and we bind to `0.0.0.0`.
If specified then we should honor the restriction and bind only to the
specified address.
Before this change, if no `-bind` is given then we would bind to
`0.0.0.0:8333` and to `127.0.0.1:8334` (incoming Tor) which is ok -
the user does not care to restrict the binding.
However, if only `-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary
`-bind=`) then we would bind to `addr:port` _and_ to `0.0.0.0:8333` in
addition.
Change the above to not do the additional bind: if only
`-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary `-bind=`) then bind
to `addr:port` (only) and consider incoming connections to that as Tor
and do not advertise it. I.e. a Tor-only node.
This is part of the "UTXO Set Statistics" project in Core, which aims
to make things like "checking coin supply" faster. This stuff, and
related things in coinstats.cpp, have always been broken for Elements
in the sense that we consider only explicit outputs and we ignore
assets (so everything just gets added together to get a meaningless
total). It probably wouldn't be too hard to restrict this to only
consider policyAsset, but it's out of scope for a rebase IMO.
Also, I think this situation is fine .. I don't understand the motivation
for this or why Core is merging this when they refuse to merge an address
index .. but I guess we'll see if there are users who care about this data
and who care about it being meaningful on Elements.
Also, apologies for the big diff -- there were some mechanical changes
to deal with CT amounts, but most of the changes related to the difference
in how fees are accounted for. While I'm not thrilled with this PR, its
functional test is really good! So I think what I eventually came up with
is internally consistent.
There are a few layers of bullshit to this PR.
First, there is the fact that it adds a functional test gated on a new
config flag which is disabled by default, so it actually adds broken
code with no tests, waiting to ruin your day 520 PRs later when #21935
enables the broken test.
Second, the test appears to be superficially nonsensical because it
generates two transactions from different wallets and tries to compare
them for byte-for-byte equality, which doesn't make sense (at least)
because change outputs are randomly located...so something fishy is
going on.
Of course, in Elements the transactions are *not* equal half the time
because the outputs are permuted, which may have let me quickly figure
out the issue, except...
Third, there is a red herring of a bug where the two transactions have
slightly different feerates. This turns out to be caused by
CWallet::CalculateMaximumSignedTxSize using differently sized dummy
transactions depending on whether watchonly outputs are included (this
fact is conveniently disguised by #17211 slightly changing this logic;
this is an unmerged PR in Core that Elements has a backport of an old
version of). And the two wallets have different watchonly settings.
A sub-red-herring is the fact that this bug results in a discrepancy
of 0.25 vbytes, so it does not appear in Core but does appear in
Elements (there is a 3/16 probability that we should be so unlucky...
we are).
But this is all irrelevant, because...
Fourth, this test is actually super bullshit. The way it works is by
constructing a PSBT legitimately, saving this to disk, then re-"signs"
using the external signer interface by using a mock signer that
COMPLETELY REPLACES THE TRANSACTION UNDER CONSTRUCTION. So it doesn't
matter what the fee output looks like and it doesn't matter what the
order of the outputs. Core does not detect this malfeasance and
neither does Elements. For some reason, Core has a functional test
that explicitly checks that you can do this even though it is insane
and it is hard to think of non-malicious reasons to do it.
Fifth, while Elements fails to detect that its external signer is
actually changing the transaction out from under it, it DOES assume
that this won't happen. In CWallet::SignPSBT it blithely un-replaces
the transaction, which undermines the functional test.
Sixth, the original PR where this test was introduced has comments
locked, so anyone who spent six hours reverse-engineering this idiotic
broken test, and is still feeling charitable enough to discuss it with
the Core developors, can go pound sand.
Anyway, just disabled the broken test and move on with our lives.
30aee2dfe6 tests: Add test for compact block HB selection (Pieter Wuille)
6efbcec4de Protect last outbound HB compact block peer (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
If all our high-bandwidth compact block serving peers (BIP 152) stall block
download, then we can be denied a block for (potentially) a long time. As
inbound connections are much more likely to be adversarial than outbound
connections, mitigate this risk by never removing our last outbound HB peer if
it would be replaced by an inbound.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 30aee2dfe6
ariard:
Code ACK 30aee2dfe
jonatack:
ACK 30aee2dfe6
Tree-SHA512: 5c6c9326e3667b97e0864c371ae2174d2be9054dad479f4366127b9cd3ac60ffa01ec9707b16ef29cac122db6916cf56fd9985733390017134ace483278921d5
Had to change a test vector to match our test framework's different deterministic
keys (when I produced these during the 0.21 rebase I made new random keys rather
than converting the existing ones, it appears).
This uses a regtest-only RPC which checks that the chain is literally
"regtest". Since regtest is disabled in Elements (we use elementsregtest)
I weakened the check for this to just check that the chain name has
"regtest" somewhere in it. Hopefully this isn't too magical.
e4356f6a6c Testcase for wallet issue with orphaned rewards. (Daniel Kraft)
Pull request description:
This adds a new test case demonstrating the wallet issue when block rewards are orphaned (#14148).
ACKs for top commit:
LarryRuane:
ACK e4356f6a6c
leonardojobim:
reACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18795/commits/e4356f6a6c18e5027a064a4d3a5deda27985f584 .
Tree-SHA512: e9a2310ee1b3d52cfa302f431ed3d272bbc1b9195439ff318d9eb1006c0b28968dbe840e1600b6ff185e5d7ea57e4dcc837cef16051b5537445e10bc363b8c22
2667366aaa tests: check derivation of P2TR (Pieter Wuille)
7cedafc541 Add tr() descriptor (derivation only, no signing) (Pieter Wuille)
90fcac365e Add TaprootBuilder class (Pieter Wuille)
5f6cc8daa8 Add XOnlyPubKey::CreateTapTweak (Pieter Wuille)
2fbfb1becb Make consensus checking of tweaks in pubkey.* Taproot-specific (Pieter Wuille)
a4bf84039c Separate WitnessV1Taproot variant in CTxDestination (Pieter Wuille)
41839bdb89 Avoid dependence on CTxDestination index order (Pieter Wuille)
31df02a070 Change Solver() output for WITNESS_V1_TAPROOT (Pieter Wuille)
4b1cc08f9f Make XOnlyPubKey act like byte container (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This is a subset of #21365, to aide review.
This adds support `tr(KEY)` or `tr(KEY,SCRIPT)` or `tr(KEY,{{S1,{{S2,S3},...}},...})` descriptors, describing Taproot outputs with specified internal key, and optionally any number of scripts, in nested groups of 2 inside `{`/`}` if there are more than one. While it permits importing `tr(KEY)`, anything beyond that is just laying foundations for more features later.
Missing:
* Signing support (see #21365)
* Support for more interesting scripts inside the tree (only `pk(KEY)` is supported for now). In particular, a multisig policy based on the new `OP_CHECKSIGADD` opcode would be very useful.
* Inferring `tr()` descriptors from outputs (given sufficient information).
* `getaddressinfo` support.
* MuSig support. Standardizing that is still an ongoing effort, and is generally kind of useless without corresponding PSBT support.
* Convenient ways of constructing descriptors without spendable internal key (especially ones that arent't trivially recognizable as such).
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
utACK 2667366 (based on https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21365#issuecomment-846945215 review, plus the new functional test)
achow101:
Code Review ACK 2667366aaa
lsilva01:
Tested ACK https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/22051/commits/2667366aaa69447a9de4d819669d254a5ebd4d4b
meshcollider:
utACK 2667366aaa
Tree-SHA512: 61046fef22c561228338cb178422f0b782ef6587ec8208d3ce2bd07afcff29a664b54b35c6b01226eb70b6540b43f6dd245043d09aa6cb6db1381b6042667e75
