8bca30ea17 [rpc] expose ability to mock scheduler via the rpc (Amiti Uttarwar)
7c8b6e5b52 [lib] add scheduler to node context (Amiti Uttarwar)
930d837542 [test] add chainparams property to indicate chain allows time mocking (Amiti Uttarwar)
1cd43e83c6 [test] unit test for new MockForward scheduler method (Amiti Uttarwar)
a6f63598ad [util] allow scheduler to be mocked (Amiti Uttarwar)
Pull request description:
This PR is to support functional tests by allowing the scheduler to be mocked via the RPC.
It adds a `MockForward` method to the scheduler class that iterates through the task queue and reschedules them to be `delta_seconds` sooner.
This is currently used to support functional testing of the "unbroadcast" set tracking in #18038. If this patch is accepted, it would also be useful to simplify the code in #16698.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
ACK 8bca30ea17, only change is some style fixups 🕓
Tree-SHA512: 2a97fe8ade2b7fd1fb5cdfa1dcafb3227a377d7a847e3845a228bc119eb77824b4aefa43d922a06d583939b22725e223f308cf092961048079d36f6b1d9a639b
c86bc14408 Make asmap Interpret tolerant of malicious map data (Pieter Wuille)
38c2395d7a Use ASNs for mapped IPv4 addresses correctly (Pieter Wuille)
6f8c937312 Mark asmap const in statistics code (Pieter Wuille)
d58bcdc4b5 Avoid asmap copies in initialization (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Here are a few things to improve in the asmap implementation. The first two commits are just code improvements. The last one is a bugfix (the exsting code wouldn't correctly apply ASN lookups to mapped/embedded IPv4 addresses).
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
ACK c86bc14408 -- patch looks correct
naumenkogs:
utACK c86bc14
laanwj:
ACK c86bc14408
jonatack:
ACK c86bc14408 code looks correct, built/ran tests, bitcoind with -asmap pointed to asmap/demo.map
Tree-SHA512: 1036f43152754d621bfbecfd3b7c7276e4670598fcaed42a3d275e51fa2cf3653e2c9e9cfa714f6c7719362541510e92171e076ac4169b55a0cc8908b2d514c0
This fixes f.e. that when arguments are set in CLI or the config file
without a network attached (`port` instead of `liquidv1.port`), they
will now be assigned to the liquidv1 instead of Bitcoin mainnet.
3c1bc40205 Add extra logging of asmap use and bucketing (Gleb Naumenko)
e4658aa8ea Return mapped AS in RPC call getpeerinfo (Gleb Naumenko)
ec45646de9 Integrate ASN bucketing in Addrman and add tests (Gleb Naumenko)
8feb4e4b66 Add asmap utility which queries a mapping (Gleb Naumenko)
Pull request description:
This PR attempts to solve the problem explained in #16599.
A particular attack which encouraged us to work on this issue is explained here [[Erebus Attack against Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network](https://erebus-attack.comp.nus.edu.sg/)] (by @muoitranduc)
Instead of relying on /16 prefix to diversify the connections every node creates, we would instead rely on the (ip -> ASN) mapping, if this mapping is provided.
A .map file can be created by every user independently based on a router dump, or provided along with the Bitcoin release. Currently we use the python scripts written by @sipa to create a .map file, which is no larger than 2MB (awesome!).
Here I suggest adding a field to peers.dat which would represent a hash of asmap file used while serializing addrman (or 0 for /16 prefix legacy approach).
In this case, every time the file is updated (or grouping method changed), all buckets will be re-computed.
I believe that alternative selective re-bucketing for only updated ranges would require substantial changes.
TODO:
- ~~more unit tests~~
- ~~find a way to test the code without including >1 MB mapping file in the repo.~~
- find a way to check that mapping file is not corrupted (checksum?)
- comments and separate tests for asmap.cpp
- make python code for .map generation public
- figure out asmap distribution (?)
~Interesting corner case: I’m using std::hash to compute a fingerprint of asmap, and std::hash returns size_t. I guess if a user updates the OS to 64-bit, then the hash of asap will change? Does it even matter?~
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
re-ACK 3c1bc40205
jamesob:
ACK 3c1bc40205 ([`jamesob/ackr/16702.3.naumenkogs.p2p_supplying_and_using`](https://github.com/jamesob/bitcoin/tree/ackr/16702.3.naumenkogs.p2p_supplying_and_using))
jonatack:
ACK 3c1bc40205
Tree-SHA512: e2dc6171188d5cdc2ab2c022fa49ed73a14a0acb8ae4c5ffa970172a0365942a249ad3d57e5fb134bc156a3492662c983f74bd21e78d316629dcadf71576800c
9dd58ca611 init: Stop indexes on shutdown after ChainStateFlushed callback. (Jim Posen)
Pull request description:
Replaces https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/17852.
Currently, the latest index state may not be committed to disk on shutdown. The state is committed on `ChainStateFlushed` callbacks and the current init order unregisters the indexes as validation interfaces before the final `ChainStateFlushed` callback is called on them.
Issue identified by paulyc.
For review: an alternative or supplemental solution would be to call `Commit` at the end of `BaseIndex::Stop`. I don't see any harm in doing so and it makes the less prone to user error. However, the destructor would have to be modified to not call `Stop` because `Commit` calls a virtual method, so I figured it wasn't worth it. But I'm curious how others feel.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
tested ACK 9dd58ca611
paulyc:
> Code review ACK [9dd58ca](9dd58ca611), but failed to test because I can't reproduce the original problem.
kallewoof:
Tested ACK 9dd58ca611
promag:
Code review ACK 9dd58ca611, but failed to test because I can't reproduce the original problem.
Tree-SHA512: 2918380b699833cb7eab07456d1667dbf8ebbe2d2b5988300a3cf5b6a6cfc818b6d9086e1936ffe7881f67e409306c4b91d61a08a169cfd0a301383479d4f3cb
3d5d7aad26 windows: remove call to SetProcessDEPPolicy (fanquake)
f2645c2601 windows: Enable heap terminate-on-corruption (fanquake)
Pull request description:
This PR is currently two separate changes:
#### Enable heap terminate-on-corruption
This is default behavior from Windows 8 onwards, however we still support Windows 7, so it should make sense to explicitly enable this. This is also done by projects like tor, chromium etc.
> Enables the terminate-on-corruption feature. If the heap manager detects an error in any heap used by the process, it calls the Windows Error Reporting service and terminates the process.
After a process enables this feature, it cannot be disabled.
More info [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/heapapi/nf-heapapi-heapsetinformation).
#### Remove call to SetProcessDEPPolicy()
DEP is always enabled on 64-bit Windows processes, and `SetProcessDEPPolicy()` only works when called from a 32-bit process. I've tested that our current usage always fails ([as expected](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-setprocessdeppolicy#remarks)) with [ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED](16151c441e/mingw-w64-headers/include/error.h (L42)).
Please don't add a "Needs gitian build" tag here yet.
ACKs for top commit:
sipsorcery:
ACK 3d5d7aad26.
laanwj:
ACK 3d5d7aad26
Tree-SHA512: 0948bcf165685b6b573f2cd950680c34356b856690de655ced2b93d497e02e7b22aa195c99f6ce33202f182622c67302ff31c98ab51b7d050574af3debdee5ce
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
# Delete outdated alias for RecursiveMutex
sed -i -e '/CCriticalSection/d' ./src/sync.h
# Replace use of outdated alias with RecursiveMutex
sed -i -e 's/CCriticalSection/RecursiveMutex/g' $(git grep -l CCriticalSection)
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
Instead of using /16 netgroups to bucket nodes in Addrman for connection
diversification, ASN, which better represents an actor in terms
of network-layer infrastructure, is used.
For testing, asmap.raw is used. It represents a minimal
asmap needed for testing purposes.
2081442c42 test: Add test for rpc_whitelist (Emil Engler)
7414d3820c Add RPC Whitelist Feature from #12248 (Jeremy Rubin)
Pull request description:
Summary
====
This patch adds the RPC whitelisting feature requested in #12248. RPC Whitelists help enforce application policies for services being built on top of Bitcoin Core (e.g., your Lightning Node maybe shouldn't be adding new peers). The aim of this PR is not to make it advisable to connect your Bitcoin node to arbitrary services, but to reduce risk and prevent unintended access.
Using RPC Whitelists
====
The way it works is you specify (in your bitcoin.conf) configurations such as
```
rpcauth=user1:4cc74397d6e9972e5ee7671fd241$11849357f26a5be7809c68a032bc2b16ab5dcf6348ef3ed1cf30dae47b8bcc71
rpcauth=user2:181b4a25317bff60f3749adee7d6bca0$d9c331474f1322975fa170a2ffbcb176ba11644211746b27c1d317f265dd4ada
rpcauth=user3:a6c8a511b53b1edcf69c36984985e$13cfba0e626db19061c9d61fa58e712d0319c11db97ad845fa84517f454f6675
rpcwhitelist=user1:getnetworkinfo
rpcwhitelist=user2:getnetworkinfo,getwalletinfo, getbestblockhash
rpcwhitelistdefault=0
```
Now user1 can only call getnetworkinfo, user2 can only call getnetworkinfo or getwalletinfo, while user3 can still call all RPCs.
If any rpcwhitelist is set, act as if all users are subject to whitelists unless rpcwhitelistdefault is set to 0. If rpcwhitelistdefault is set to 1 and no rpcwhitelist is set, act as if all users are subject to whitelists.
Review Request
=====
In addition to normal review, would love specific review from someone working on LN (e.g., @ roasbeef) and someone working on an infrastructure team at an exchange (e.g., @ jimpo) to check that this works well with their system.
Notes
=====
The rpc list is spelling sensitive -- whitespace is stripped though. Spelling errors fail towards the RPC call being blocked, which is safer.
It was unclear to me if HTTPReq_JSONRPC is the best function to patch this functionality into, or if it would be better to place it in exec or somewhere else.
It was also unclear to me if it would be preferred to cache the whitelists on startup or parse them on every RPC as is done with multiUserAuthorized. I opted for the cached approach as I thought it was a bit cleaner.
Future Work
=====
In a future PR, I would like to add an inheritance scheme. This seemed more controversial so I didn't want to include that here. Inheritance semantics are tricky, but it would also make these whitelists easier to read.
It also might be good to add a `getrpcwhitelist` command to facilitate permission discovery.
Tests
=====
Thanks to @ emilengler for adding tests for this feature. The tests cover all cases except for where `rpcwhitelistdefault=1` is used, given difficulties around testing with the current test framework.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK 2081442c42
Tree-SHA512: 0dc1ac6a6f2f4b0be9c9054d495dd17752fe7b3589aeab2c6ac4e1f91cf4e7e355deedcb5d76d707cbb5a949c2f989c871b74d6bf129351f429569a701adbcbf
fa538813b1 scripted-diff: Replace ::mempool with m_node.mempool in tests (MarcoFalke)
8888ad02e2 test: Replace recursive lock with locking annotations (MarcoFalke)
fac07f2038 node: Add reference to mempool in NodeContext (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
This is the first step toward making the mempool a global that is not initialized before main.
#### Motivation
Currently the mempool is a global that is initialized before the `main` function. This is confusing and easy to get wrong. E.g. the mempool constructor queries state that has not been initialized, like randomness (fixed), or command line arguments (not an issue last time I checked). Also without having the chainstate (chain tip) initialized first, it doesn't make conceptually sense to have a mempool, since the mempool builds txs on top of the utxo set (chain tip).
Finally, in the future someone might want to run a consensus-only full node (`-nowallet -noblockfilter -no... -nomempool` command line options) that only verifies blocks and updates the utxo set.
This is conceptually the same change that has already been done for the connection manager `CConnman`.
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
utACK fa538813b1
ariard:
Tested ACK fa53881.
Tree-SHA512: 2c446a8a51476354aad7126c2b833500d36b24490caa94f847b2bdc622054de0dae28980f23e3d91b1b492dc32931656d98dbd019af9e4e58f2f8c5375aac694
