Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#33788: [29.x] Backport fixes for CVE-2025-46598

6f136cd391 tests: drop expect_disconnect behaviour for tx relay (Anthony Towns)
be0857745a validation: only check input scripts once (Anthony Towns)
65bcbbc538 net_processing: drop MaybePunishNodeForTx (Anthony Towns)
f24291bd96 qa: unit test sighash caching (Antoine Poinsot)
73d3ab8fc9 qa: simple differential fuzzing for sighash with/without caching (Antoine Poinsot)
ddfb9150b8 script: (optimization) introduce sighash midstate caching (Pieter Wuille)
354d46bc10 script: (refactor) prepare for introducing sighash midstate cache (Pieter Wuille)
5a0506eea0 tests: add sighash caching tests to feature_taproot (Pieter Wuille)
020ed613be validation: detect witness stripping without re-running Script checks (Antoine Poinsot)
56626300b8 policy: introduce a helper to detect whether a transaction spends Segwit outputs (Antoine Poinsot)
97088fa75a qa: test witness stripping in p2p_segwit (Antoine Poinsot)

Pull request description:

ACKs for top commit:
  sipa:
    Code review ACK 6f136cd391
  glozow:
    ACK 6f136cd391, looks correct
  darosior:
    ACK 6f136cd391

Tree-SHA512: 445d770ae10bf1c4766810f945a8e5d83bfa0869d346b0f93c237b91101c9af45d6c935414e79ebf5e0c7089599a9a5a96cff82d9703b1d9573ce9deb21971fd
This commit is contained in:
merge-script 2026-01-12 11:40:55 -08:00
commit 6e7ea3cf2a
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22 changed files with 563 additions and 168 deletions

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@ -1238,13 +1238,8 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
// Check input scripts and signatures.
// This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
if (!CheckInputScripts(tx, state, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata, GetValidationCache())) {
// SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK requires SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS, so we
// need to turn both off, and compare against just turning off CLEANSTACK
// to see if the failure is specifically due to witness validation.
TxValidationState state_dummy; // Want reported failures to be from first CheckInputScripts
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputScripts(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata, GetValidationCache()) &&
!CheckInputScripts(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata, GetValidationCache())) {
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
// Detect a failure due to a missing witness so that p2p code can handle rejection caching appropriately.
if (!tx.HasWitness() && SpendsNonAnchorWitnessProg(tx, m_view)) {
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED,
state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
@ -2214,34 +2209,17 @@ bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
if (pvChecks) {
pvChecks->emplace_back(std::move(check));
} else if (auto result = check(); result.has_value()) {
// Tx failures never trigger disconnections/bans.
// This is so that network splits aren't triggered
// either due to non-consensus relay policies (such as
// non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy
// arguments) or due to new consensus rules introduced in
// soft forks.
if (flags & STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS) {
// Check whether the failure was caused by a
// non-mandatory script verification check, such as
// non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy
// arguments; if so, ensure we return NOT_STANDARD
// instead of CONSENSUS to avoid downstream users
// splitting the network between upgraded and
// non-upgraded nodes by banning CONSENSUS-failing
// data providers.
CScriptCheck check2(txdata.m_spent_outputs[i], tx, validation_cache.m_signature_cache, i,
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
auto mandatory_result = check2();
if (!mandatory_result.has_value()) {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(result->first)), result->second);
} else {
// If the second check failed, it failed due to a mandatory script verification
// flag, but the first check might have failed on a non-mandatory script
// verification flag.
//
// Avoid reporting a mandatory script check failure with a non-mandatory error
// string by reporting the error from the second check.
result = mandatory_result;
}
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("mempool-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(result->first)), result->second);
} else {
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(result->first)), result->second);
}
// MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
// TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS.
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(result->first)), result->second);
}
}