Merge 80cb630bd9 into merged_master (Bitcoin PR bitcoin/bitcoin#31216)

This commit is contained in:
ivanlele 2026-04-02 13:11:39 +00:00
commit 6be1d4093a
No known key found for this signature in database
40 changed files with 1059 additions and 225 deletions

View file

@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ message("Configuring secp256k1 subtree...")
set(SECP256K1_DISABLE_SHARED ON CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH ON CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY ON CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG OFF CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(SECP256K1_BUILD_BENCHMARK OFF CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS ${BUILD_TESTS} CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)
set(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS ${BUILD_TESTS} CACHE BOOL "" FORCE)

View file

@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ env:
RECOVERY: no
EXTRAKEYS: no
SCHNORRSIG: no
MUSIG: no
ELLSWIFT: no
### test options
SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS:
SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS: 64
BENCH: yes
SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS: 2
CTIMETESTS: yes
@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ task:
RECOVERY: yes
EXTRAKEYS: yes
SCHNORRSIG: yes
MUSIG: yes
ELLSWIFT: yes
matrix:
# Currently only gcc-snapshot, the other compilers are tested on GHA with QEMU
@ -86,6 +88,7 @@ task:
RECOVERY: yes
EXTRAKEYS: yes
SCHNORRSIG: yes
MUSIG: yes
ELLSWIFT: yes
WRAPPER_CMD: 'valgrind --error-exitcode=42'
SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS: 2

View file

@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ env:
RECOVERY: 'no'
EXTRAKEYS: 'no'
SCHNORRSIG: 'no'
MUSIG: 'no'
ELLSWIFT: 'no'
ECDSA_S2C: 'no'
GENERATOR: 'no'
@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ env:
BPPP: 'no'
SCHNORRSIG_HALFAGG: 'no'
### test options
SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS:
SECP256K1_TEST_ITERS: 64
BENCH: 'yes'
SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS: 2
CTIMETESTS: 'yes'
@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -265,6 +268,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -320,6 +324,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -385,6 +390,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -447,6 +453,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -508,6 +515,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -575,6 +583,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -632,6 +641,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'
@ -834,14 +844,14 @@ jobs:
# Use the bash shell included with Git for Windows.
shell: bash
run: |
cd build/src/RelWithDebInfo && file *tests.exe bench*.exe libsecp256k1-*.dll || true
cd build/bin/RelWithDebInfo && file *tests.exe bench*.exe libsecp256k1-*.dll || true
- name: Check
run: |
ctest -C RelWithDebInfo --test-dir build -j ([int]$env:NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS + 1)
build\src\RelWithDebInfo\bench_ecmult.exe
build\src\RelWithDebInfo\bench_internal.exe
build\src\RelWithDebInfo\bench.exe
build\bin\RelWithDebInfo\bench_ecmult.exe
build\bin\RelWithDebInfo\bench_internal.exe
build\bin\RelWithDebInfo\bench.exe
win64-native-headers:
name: "x64 (MSVC): C++ (public headers)"
@ -873,6 +883,7 @@ jobs:
RECOVERY: 'yes'
EXTRAKEYS: 'yes'
SCHNORRSIG: 'yes'
MUSIG: 'yes'
ELLSWIFT: 'yes'
EXPERIMENTAL: 'yes'
ECDSA_S2C: 'yes'

View file

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ ecdh_example
ecdsa_example
schnorr_example
ellswift_example
musig_example
*.exe
*.so
*.a

View file

@ -8,7 +8,26 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
## [Unreleased]
## [0.6.0] - 2024-11-04
#### Added
- New module `musig` implements the MuSig2 multisignature scheme according to the [BIP 327 specification](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0327.mediawiki). See:
- Header file `include/secp256k1_musig.h` which defines the new API.
- Document `doc/musig.md` for further notes on API usage.
- Usage example `examples/musig.c`.
- New CMake variable `SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS` for appending linker flags to the build command.
#### Changed
- API functions now use a significantly more robust method to clear secrets from the stack before returning. However, secret clearing remains a best-effort security measure and cannot guarantee complete removal.
- Any type `secp256k1_foo` can now be forward-declared using `typedef struct secp256k1_foo secp256k1_foo;` (or also `struct secp256k1_foo;` in C++).
- Organized CMake build artifacts into dedicated directories (`bin/` for executables, `lib/` for libraries) to improve build output structure and Windows shared library compatibility.
#### Removed
- Removed the `secp256k1_scratch_space` struct and its associated functions `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` because the scratch space was unused in the API.
#### ABI Compatibility
The symbols `secp256k1_scratch_space_create` and `secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy` were removed.
Otherwise, the library maintains backward compatibility with versions 0.3.x through 0.5.x.
## [0.5.1] - 2024-08-01
@ -146,7 +165,7 @@ This version was in fact never released.
The number was given by the build system since the introduction of autotools in Jan 2014 (ea0fe5a5bf0c04f9cc955b2966b614f5f378c6f6).
Therefore, this version number does not uniquely identify a set of source files.
[unreleased]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.5.1...HEAD
[0.6.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.5.1...v0.6.0
[0.5.1]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1
[0.5.0]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.4.1...v0.5.0
[0.4.1]: https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/compare/v0.4.0...v0.4.1

View file

@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.16)
#=============================
# Project / Package metadata
#=============================
project(libsecp256k1
# The package (a.k.a. release) version is based on semantic versioning 2.0.0 of
# the API. All changes in experimental modules are treated as
# backwards-compatible and therefore at most increase the minor version.
VERSION 0.5.2
VERSION 0.6.0
DESCRIPTION "Optimized C library for ECDSA signatures and secret/public key operations on curve secp256k1."
HOMEPAGE_URL "https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1"
LANGUAGES C
)
enable_testing()
list(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake)
if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS 3.21)
get_directory_property(parent_directory PARENT_DIRECTORY)
@ -27,15 +32,19 @@ endif()
# https://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/manual/html_node/Updating-version-info.html
# All changes in experimental modules are treated as if they don't affect the
# interface and therefore only increase the revision.
set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_CURRENT 4)
set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION 2)
set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_AGE 2)
set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_CURRENT 5)
set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_REVISION 0)
set(${PROJECT_NAME}_LIB_VERSION_AGE 0)
#=============================
# Language setup
#=============================
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 90)
set(CMAKE_C_EXTENSIONS OFF)
list(APPEND CMAKE_MODULE_PATH ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/cmake)
#=============================
# Configurable options
#=============================
option(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS "Build shared libraries." ON)
option(SECP256K1_DISABLE_SHARED "Disable shared library. Overrides BUILD_SHARED_LIBS." OFF)
if(SECP256K1_DISABLE_SHARED)
@ -52,6 +61,7 @@ option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH "Enable ECDH module." ON)
option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY "Enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module." OFF)
option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS "Enable extrakeys module." ON)
option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG "Enable schnorrsig module." ON)
option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG "Enable musig module." ON)
option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT "Enable ElligatorSwift module." ON)
option(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR "Enable NUMS generator module." ON)
@ -122,6 +132,14 @@ if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT)
add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT=1)
endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG)
if(DEFINED SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG AND NOT SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
message(FATAL_ERROR "Module dependency error: You have disabled the schnorrsig module explicitly, but it is required by the musig module.")
endif()
set(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG ON)
add_compile_definitions(ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG=1)
endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
if(DEFINED SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS AND NOT SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS)
message(FATAL_ERROR "Module dependency error: You have disabled the extrakeys module explicitly, but it is required by the schnorrsig module.")
@ -331,6 +349,15 @@ if(SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS)
string(APPEND CMAKE_C_LINK_EXECUTABLE " ${SECP256K1_APPEND_LDFLAGS}")
endif()
if(NOT CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY)
set(CMAKE_RUNTIME_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/bin)
endif()
if(NOT CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
endif()
if(NOT CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY)
set(CMAKE_ARCHIVE_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY ${PROJECT_BINARY_DIR}/lib)
endif()
add_subdirectory(src)
all_targets_compile_options(src "${SECP256K1_LATE_CFLAGS}")
if(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXAMPLES)
@ -354,6 +381,7 @@ message(" ECDH ................................ ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH}
message(" ECDSA pubkey recovery ............... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY}")
message(" extrakeys ........................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS}")
message(" schnorrsig .......................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG}")
message(" musig ............................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG}")
message(" ElligatorSwift ...................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT}")
message(" generator ........................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR}")
message(" rangeproof .......................... ${SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF}")

View file

@ -206,6 +206,17 @@ ellswift_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
endif
TESTS += ellswift_example
endif
if ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
noinst_PROGRAMS += musig_example
musig_example_SOURCES = examples/musig.c
musig_example_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -DSECP256K1_STATIC
musig_example_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la
musig_example_LDFLAGS = -static
if BUILD_WINDOWS
musig_example_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
endif
TESTS += musig_example
endif
endif
### Precomputed tables
@ -265,6 +276,7 @@ maintainer-clean-local: clean-testvectors
### Additional files to distribute
EXTRA_DIST = autogen.sh CHANGELOG.md SECURITY.md
EXTRA_DIST += doc/release-process.md doc/safegcd_implementation.md
EXTRA_DIST += doc/ellswift.md doc/musig.md
EXTRA_DIST += examples/EXAMPLES_COPYING
EXTRA_DIST += sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage
EXTRA_DIST += sage/gen_split_lambda_constants.sage
@ -320,6 +332,10 @@ if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG
include src/modules/schnorrsig/Makefile.am.include
endif
if ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
include src/modules/musig/Makefile.am.include
endif
if ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
include src/modules/ellswift/Makefile.am.include
endif

View file

@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ AC_PREREQ([2.60])
# the API. All changes in experimental modules are treated as
# backwards-compatible and therefore at most increase the minor version.
define(_PKG_VERSION_MAJOR, 0)
define(_PKG_VERSION_MINOR, 5)
define(_PKG_VERSION_PATCH, 2)
define(_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, false)
define(_PKG_VERSION_MINOR, 6)
define(_PKG_VERSION_PATCH, 0)
define(_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, true)
# The library version is based on libtool versioning of the ABI. The set of
# rules for updating the version can be found here:
# https://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/manual/html_node/Updating-version-info.html
# All changes in experimental modules are treated as if they don't affect the
# interface and therefore only increase the revision.
define(_LIB_VERSION_CURRENT, 4)
define(_LIB_VERSION_REVISION, 2)
define(_LIB_VERSION_AGE, 2)
define(_LIB_VERSION_CURRENT, 5)
define(_LIB_VERSION_REVISION, 0)
define(_LIB_VERSION_AGE, 0)
AC_INIT([libsecp256k1],m4_join([.], _PKG_VERSION_MAJOR, _PKG_VERSION_MINOR, _PKG_VERSION_PATCH)m4_if(_PKG_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, [true], [], [-dev]),[https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1/issues],[libsecp256k1],[https://github.com/bitcoin-core/secp256k1])
@ -510,6 +510,14 @@ if test x"$enable_module_ellswift" = x"yes"; then
SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT=1"
fi
if test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"; then
if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"no"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Module dependency error: You have disabled the schnorrsig module explicitly, but it is required by the musig module.])
fi
enable_module_schnorrsig=yes
SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES="$SECP_CONFIG_DEFINES -DENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG=1"
fi
if test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"; then
if test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"no"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Module dependency error: You have disabled the extrakeys module explicitly, but it is required by the schnorrsig module.])
@ -601,6 +609,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_EXTRAKEYS], [test x"$enable_module_extrakeys" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG], [test x"$enable_module_schnorrsig" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG], [test x"$enable_module_musig" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT], [test x"$enable_module_ellswift" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_GENERATOR], [test x"$enable_module_generator" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RANGEPROOF], [test x"$enable_module_rangeproof" = x"yes"])
@ -637,6 +646,7 @@ echo " module ecdh = $enable_module_ecdh"
echo " module recovery = $enable_module_recovery"
echo " module extrakeys = $enable_module_extrakeys"
echo " module schnorrsig = $enable_module_schnorrsig"
echo " module musig = $enable_module_musig"
echo " module ellswift = $enable_module_ellswift"
# libsecp256k1-zkp modules, in the order they were added to the libsecp256k1-zkp
echo " module generator = $enable_module_generator"

View file

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
Notes on the musig module API
===========================
The following sections contain additional notes on the API of the musig module (`include/secp256k1_musig.h`).
A usage example can be found in `examples/musig.c`.
## API misuse
The musig API is designed with a focus on misuse resistance.
However, due to the interactive nature of the MuSig protocol, there are additional failure modes that are not present in regular (single-party) Schnorr signature creation.
While the results can be catastrophic (e.g. leaking of the secret key), it is unfortunately not possible for the musig implementation to prevent all such failure modes.
Therefore, users of the musig module must take great care to make sure of the following:
1. A unique nonce per signing session is generated in `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen`.
See the corresponding comment in `include/secp256k1_musig.h` for how to ensure that.
2. The `secp256k1_musig_secnonce` structure is never copied or serialized.
See also the comment on `secp256k1_musig_secnonce` in `include/secp256k1_musig.h`.
3. Opaque data structures are never written to or read from directly.
Instead, only the provided accessor functions are used.
## Key Aggregation and (Taproot) Tweaking
Given a set of public keys, the aggregate public key is computed with `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg`.
A plain tweak can be added to the resulting public key with `secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add` by setting the `tweak32` argument to the hash defined in BIP 32. Similarly, a Taproot tweak can be added with `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` by setting the `tweak32` argument to the TapTweak hash defined in BIP 341.
Both types of tweaking can be combined and invoked multiple times if the specific application requires it.
## Signing
This is covered by `examples/musig.c`.
Essentially, the protocol proceeds in the following steps:
1. Generate a keypair with `secp256k1_keypair_create` and obtain the public key with `secp256k1_keypair_pub`.
2. Call `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg` with the pubkeys of all participants.
3. Optionally add a (Taproot) tweak with `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_xonly_tweak_add` and a plain tweak with `secp256k1_musig_pubkey_ec_tweak_add`.
4. Generate a pair of secret and public nonce with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen` and send the public nonce to the other signers.
5. Someone (not necessarily the signer) aggregates the public nonces with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg` and sends it to the signers.
6. Process the aggregate nonce with `secp256k1_musig_nonce_process`.
7. Create a partial signature with `secp256k1_musig_partial_sign`.
8. Verify the partial signatures (optional in some scenarios) with `secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_verify`.
9. Someone (not necessarily the signer) obtains all partial signatures and aggregates them into the final Schnorr signature using `secp256k1_musig_partial_sig_agg`.
The aggregate signature can be verified with `secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify`.
Steps 1 through 5 above can occur before or after the signers are aware of the message to be signed.
Whenever possible, it is recommended to generate the nonces only after the message is known.
This provides enhanced defense-in-depth measures, protecting against potential API misuse in certain scenarios.
However, it does require two rounds of communication during the signing process.
The alternative, generating the nonces in a pre-processing step before the message is known, eliminates these additional protective measures but allows for non-interactive signing.
Similarly, the API supports an alternative protocol flow where generating the aggregate key (steps 1 to 3) is allowed to happen after exchanging nonces (steps 4 to 5).
## Verification
A participant who wants to verify the partial signatures, but does not sign itself may do so using the above instructions except that the verifier skips steps 1, 4 and 7.

View file

@ -9,14 +9,7 @@ function(add_example name)
$<$<PLATFORM_ID:Windows>:bcrypt>
)
set(test_name ${name}_example)
add_test(NAME ${test_name} COMMAND ${target_name})
if(BUILD_SHARED_LIBS AND MSVC)
# The DLL must reside either in the same folder where the executable is
# or somewhere in PATH. Using the latter option.
set_tests_properties(${test_name} PROPERTIES
ENVIRONMENT "PATH=$<TARGET_FILE_DIR:secp256k1>;$ENV{PATH}"
)
endif()
add_test(NAME secp256k1_${test_name} COMMAND ${target_name})
endfunction()
add_example(ecdsa)
@ -32,3 +25,7 @@ endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT)
add_example(ellswift)
endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG)
add_example(musig)
endif()

View file

@ -42,18 +42,16 @@ int main(void) {
assert(return_val);
/*** Key Generation ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) && secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
break;
}
if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
* order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
* with a properly functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) || !secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */

View file

@ -49,18 +49,16 @@ int main(void) {
assert(return_val);
/*** Key Generation ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey)) {
break;
}
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
* order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
* with a properly functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */

View file

@ -47,18 +47,16 @@ int main(void) {
assert(return_val);
/*** Generate secret keys ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) && secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
break;
}
if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's
* order), we fail. Note that the probability of this occurring is negligible
* with a properly functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) || !secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Generate ElligatorSwift public keys. This should never fail with valid context and

View file

@ -43,20 +43,17 @@ int main(void) {
assert(return_val);
/*** Key Generation ***/
/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
* happening is negligible. */
while (1) {
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* Try to create a keypair with a valid context, it should only fail if
* the secret key is zero or out of range. */
if (secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, seckey)) {
break;
}
if (!fill_random(seckey, sizeof(seckey))) {
printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
return 1;
}
/* Try to create a keypair with a valid context. This only fails if the
* secret key is zero or out of range (greater than secp256k1's order). Note
* that the probability of this occurring is negligible with a properly
* functioning random number generator. */
if (!secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, seckey)) {
printf("Generated secret key is invalid. This indicates an issue with the random number generator.\n");
return 1;
}
/* Extract the X-only public key from the keypair. We pass NULL for

View file

@ -49,19 +49,6 @@ extern "C" {
*/
typedef struct secp256k1_context_struct secp256k1_context;
/** Opaque data structure that holds rewritable "scratch space"
*
* The purpose of this structure is to replace dynamic memory allocations,
* because we target architectures where this may not be available. It is
* essentially a resizable (within specified parameters) block of bytes,
* which is initially created either by memory allocation or TODO as a pointer
* into some fixed rewritable space.
*
* Unlike the context object, this cannot safely be shared between threads
* without additional synchronization logic.
*/
typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct secp256k1_scratch_space;
/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed and valid public key.
*
* The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
@ -71,11 +58,11 @@ typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct secp256k1_scratch_space;
* use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse. To
* compare keys, use secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct secp256k1_pubkey {
unsigned char data[64];
} secp256k1_pubkey;
/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.
/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed ECDSA signature.
*
* The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
* guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
@ -84,7 +71,7 @@ typedef struct {
* comparison, use the secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_* and
* secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_* functions.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct secp256k1_ecdsa_signature {
unsigned char data[64];
} secp256k1_ecdsa_signature;
@ -147,6 +134,15 @@ typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(
* 1. If using Libtool, it defines DLL_EXPORT automatically.
* 2. In other cases, SECP256K1_DLL_EXPORT must be defined. */
# define SECP256K1_API extern __declspec (dllexport)
# else
/* Building libsecp256k1 as a static library on Windows.
* No declspec is needed, and so we would want the non-Windows-specific
* logic below take care of this case. However, this may result in setting
* __attribute__ ((visibility("default"))), which is supposed to be a noop
* on Windows but may trigger warnings when compiling with -flto due to a
* bug in GCC, see
* https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116478 . */
# define SECP256K1_API extern
# endif
/* The user must define SECP256K1_STATIC when consuming libsecp256k1 as a static
* library on Windows. */
@ -156,11 +152,12 @@ typedef int (*secp256k1_nonce_function)(
# endif
#endif
#ifndef SECP256K1_API
/* All cases not captured by the Windows-specific logic. */
# if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 4) && defined(SECP256K1_BUILD)
/* Building libsecp256k1 on non-Windows using GCC or compatible. */
/* Building libsecp256k1 using GCC or compatible. */
# define SECP256K1_API extern __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
# else
/* All cases not captured above. */
/* Fall back to standard C's extern. */
# define SECP256K1_API extern
# endif
#endif
@ -392,29 +389,6 @@ SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(
const void *data
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
/** Create a secp256k1 scratch space object.
*
* Returns: a newly created scratch space.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object.
* In: size: amount of memory to be available as scratch space. Some extra
* (<100 bytes) will be allocated for extra accounting.
*/
SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT secp256k1_scratch_space *secp256k1_scratch_space_create(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
size_t size
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
/** Destroy a secp256k1 scratch space.
*
* The pointer may not be used afterwards.
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object.
* scratch: space to destroy
*/
SECP256K1_API void secp256k1_scratch_space_destroy(
const secp256k1_context *ctx,
secp256k1_scratch_space *scratch
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1);
/** Parse a variable-length public key into the pubkey object.
*
* Returns: 1 if the public key was fully valid.
@ -665,12 +639,14 @@ SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(
const void *ndata
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
/** Verify an ECDSA secret key.
/** Verify an elliptic curve secret key.
*
* A secret key is valid if it is not 0 and less than the secp256k1 curve order
* when interpreted as an integer (most significant byte first). The
* probability of choosing a 32-byte string uniformly at random which is an
* invalid secret key is negligible.
* invalid secret key is negligible. However, if it does happen it should
* be assumed that the randomness source is severely broken and there should
* be no retry.
*
* Returns: 1: secret key is valid
* 0: secret key is invalid

View file

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ extern "C" {
* use secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize and secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_parse. To
* compare keys, use secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_cmp.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct secp256k1_xonly_pubkey {
unsigned char data[64];
} secp256k1_xonly_pubkey;
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ typedef struct {
* guaranteed to be portable between different platforms or versions. It is
* however guaranteed to be 96 bytes in size, and can be safely copied/moved.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct secp256k1_keypair {
unsigned char data[96];
} secp256k1_keypair;
@ -155,10 +155,13 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_
const unsigned char *tweak32
) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5);
/** Compute the keypair for a secret key.
/** Compute the keypair for a valid secret key.
*
* Returns: 1: secret was valid, keypair is ready to use
* 0: secret was invalid, try again with a different secret
* See the documentation of `secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify` for more information
* about the validity of secret keys.
*
* Returns: 1: secret key is valid
* 0: secret key is invalid
* Args: ctx: pointer to a context object (not secp256k1_context_static).
* Out: keypair: pointer to the created keypair.
* In: seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key.

View file

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/** Opaque data structured that holds a parsed ECDSA signature,
/** Opaque data structure that holds a parsed ECDSA signature,
* supporting pubkey recovery.
*
* The exact representation of data inside is implementation defined and not
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ extern "C" {
* recoverability) will have identical representation, so they can be
* memcmp'ed.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature {
unsigned char data[65];
} secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature;

View file

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ SECP256K1_API const secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened secp256k1_nonce_function_b
* secp256k1_nonce_function_bip340 is used, then ndata must be a
* pointer to 32-byte auxiliary randomness as per BIP-340.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct secp256k1_schnorrsig_extraparams {
unsigned char magic[4];
secp256k1_nonce_function_hardened noncefp;
void *ndata;

View file

@ -87,12 +87,12 @@ endif()
if(SECP256K1_BUILD_TESTS)
add_executable(noverify_tests tests.c)
target_link_libraries(noverify_tests secp256k1_precomputed secp256k1_asm)
add_test(NAME noverify_tests COMMAND noverify_tests)
add_test(NAME secp256k1_noverify_tests COMMAND noverify_tests)
if(NOT CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE STREQUAL "Coverage")
add_executable(tests tests.c)
target_compile_definitions(tests PRIVATE VERIFY)
target_link_libraries(tests secp256k1_precomputed secp256k1_asm)
add_test(NAME tests COMMAND tests)
add_test(NAME secp256k1_tests COMMAND tests)
endif()
endif()
@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ if(SECP256K1_BUILD_EXHAUSTIVE_TESTS)
add_executable(exhaustive_tests tests_exhaustive.c)
target_link_libraries(exhaustive_tests secp256k1_asm)
target_compile_definitions(exhaustive_tests PRIVATE $<$<NOT:$<CONFIG:Coverage>>:VERIFY>)
add_test(NAME exhaustive_tests COMMAND exhaustive_tests)
add_test(NAME secp256k1_exhaustive_tests COMMAND exhaustive_tests)
endif()
if(SECP256K1_BUILD_CTIME_TESTS)
@ -157,6 +157,9 @@ if(SECP256K1_INSTALL)
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORRSIG)
list(APPEND ${PROJECT_NAME}_headers "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h")
endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG)
list(APPEND ${PROJECT_NAME}_headers "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/secp256k1_musig.h")
endif()
if(SECP256K1_ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT)
list(APPEND ${PROJECT_NAME}_headers "${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/include/secp256k1_ellswift.h")
endif()

View file

@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static void bench_ecmult_teardown_helper(bench_data* data, size_t* seckey_offset
secp256k1_scalar sum_scalars;
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&sum_output);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sum_scalars);
secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sum_scalars, 0);
for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) {
secp256k1_gej_add_var(&sum_output, &sum_output, &data->output[i], NULL);
if (scalar_gen_offset != NULL) {

View file

@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
#include "../include/secp256k1_schnorrsig.h"
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
#include "../include/secp256k1_musig.h"
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
#include "../include/secp256k1_ellswift.h"
#endif
@ -193,6 +197,58 @@ static void run_tests(secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *key) {
CHECK(ret == 1);
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_MUSIG
{
secp256k1_pubkey pk;
const secp256k1_pubkey *pk_ptr[1];
secp256k1_xonly_pubkey agg_pk;
unsigned char session_secrand[32];
uint64_t nonrepeating_cnt = 0;
secp256k1_musig_secnonce secnonce;
secp256k1_musig_pubnonce pubnonce;
const secp256k1_musig_pubnonce *pubnonce_ptr[1];
secp256k1_musig_aggnonce aggnonce;
secp256k1_musig_keyagg_cache cache;
secp256k1_musig_session session;
secp256k1_musig_partial_sig partial_sig;
unsigned char extra_input[32];
pk_ptr[0] = &pk;
pubnonce_ptr[0] = &pubnonce;
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(key, 32);
memcpy(session_secrand, key, sizeof(session_secrand));
session_secrand[0] = session_secrand[0] + 1;
memcpy(extra_input, key, sizeof(extra_input));
extra_input[0] = extra_input[0] + 2;
CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key));
CHECK(secp256k1_keypair_pub(ctx, &pk, &keypair));
CHECK(secp256k1_musig_pubkey_agg(ctx, &agg_pk, &cache, pk_ptr, 1));
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(session_secrand, sizeof(session_secrand));
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(extra_input, sizeof(extra_input));
ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen(ctx, &secnonce, &pubnonce, session_secrand, key, &pk, msg, &cache, extra_input);
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
CHECK(ret == 1);
ret = secp256k1_musig_nonce_gen_counter(ctx, &secnonce, &pubnonce, nonrepeating_cnt, &keypair, msg, &cache, extra_input);
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
CHECK(ret == 1);
CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(ctx, &aggnonce, pubnonce_ptr, 1));
/* Make sure that previous tests don't undefine msg. It's not used as a secret here. */
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(msg, sizeof(msg));
CHECK(secp256k1_musig_nonce_process(ctx, &session, &aggnonce, msg, &cache) == 1);
ret = secp256k1_keypair_create(ctx, &keypair, key);
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
CHECK(ret == 1);
ret = secp256k1_musig_partial_sign(ctx, &partial_sig, &secnonce, &keypair, &cache, &session);
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_DEFINE(&ret, sizeof(ret));
CHECK(ret == 1);
}
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_ELLSWIFT
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(key, 32);
ret = secp256k1_ellswift_create(ctx, ellswift, key, NULL);

View file

@ -171,7 +171,9 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(int *wnaf, int len, const secp256k1_scalar *a,
VERIFY_CHECK(a != NULL);
VERIFY_CHECK(2 <= w && w <= 31);
memset(wnaf, 0, len * sizeof(wnaf[0]));
for (bit = 0; bit < len; bit++) {
wnaf[bit] = 0;
}
s = *a;
if (secp256k1_scalar_get_bits(&s, 255, 1)) {
@ -179,6 +181,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_wnaf(int *wnaf, int len, const secp256k1_scalar *a,
sign = -1;
}
bit = 0;
while (bit < len) {
int now;
int word;
@ -660,7 +663,6 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch(const secp256k1_callback* error_call
struct secp256k1_pippenger_state *state_space;
size_t idx = 0;
size_t point_idx = 0;
int i, j;
int bucket_window;
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r);
@ -708,18 +710,6 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_batch(const secp256k1_callback* error_call
}
secp256k1_ecmult_pippenger_wnaf(buckets, bucket_window, state_space, r, scalars, points, idx);
/* Clear data */
for(i = 0; (size_t)i < idx; i++) {
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&scalars[i]);
state_space->ps[i].skew_na = 0;
for(j = 0; j < WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1); j++) {
state_space->wnaf_na[i * WNAF_SIZE(bucket_window+1) + j] = 0;
}
}
for(i = 0; i < 1<<bucket_window; i++) {
secp256k1_gej_clear(&buckets[i]);
}
secp256k1_scratch_apply_checkpoint(error_callback, scratch, scratch_checkpoint);
return 1;
}

View file

@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_const_beta = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(
# define secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero secp256k1_fe_impl_normalizes_to_zero
# define secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var secp256k1_fe_impl_normalizes_to_zero_var
# define secp256k1_fe_set_int secp256k1_fe_impl_set_int
# define secp256k1_fe_clear secp256k1_fe_impl_clear
# define secp256k1_fe_is_zero secp256k1_fe_impl_is_zero
# define secp256k1_fe_is_odd secp256k1_fe_impl_is_odd
# define secp256k1_fe_cmp_var secp256k1_fe_impl_cmp_var
@ -144,11 +143,7 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(const secp256k1_fe *r);
*/
static void secp256k1_fe_set_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a);
/** Set a field element to 0.
*
* On input, a does not need to be initialized.
* On output, a represents 0, is normalized and has magnitude 0.
*/
/** Clear a field element to prevent leaking sensitive information. */
static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a);
/** Determine whether a represents field element 0.

View file

@ -270,13 +270,6 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_impl_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
return a->n[0] & 1;
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_impl_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) {
int i;
for (i=0; i<10; i++) {
a->n[i] = 0;
}
}
static int secp256k1_fe_impl_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) {
int i;
for (i = 9; i >= 0; i--) {

View file

@ -212,13 +212,6 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_impl_is_odd(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
return a->n[0] & 1;
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_impl_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) {
int i;
for (i=0; i<5; i++) {
a->n[i] = 0;
}
}
static int secp256k1_fe_impl_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) {
int i;
for (i = 4; i >= 0; i--) {

View file

@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
#error "Please select wide multiplication implementation"
#endif
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) {
secp256k1_memclear(a, sizeof(secp256k1_fe));
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_equal(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b) {
secp256k1_fe na;
SECP256K1_FE_VERIFY(a);
@ -232,15 +236,6 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_add_int(secp256k1_fe *r, int a) {
SECP256K1_FE_VERIFY(r);
}
static void secp256k1_fe_impl_clear(secp256k1_fe *a);
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_fe_clear(secp256k1_fe *a) {
a->magnitude = 0;
a->normalized = 1;
secp256k1_fe_impl_clear(a);
SECP256K1_FE_VERIFY(a);
}
static int secp256k1_fe_impl_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a);
SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_fe_is_zero(const secp256k1_fe *a) {
SECP256K1_FE_VERIFY(a);

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ typedef struct {
static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash);
static void secp256k1_sha256_write(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size);
static void secp256k1_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32);
static void secp256k1_sha256_clear(secp256k1_sha256 *hash);
typedef struct {
secp256k1_sha256 inner, outer;
@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ typedef struct {
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t size);
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size);
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, unsigned char *out32);
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_clear(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash);
typedef struct {
unsigned char v[32];
@ -37,5 +39,6 @@ typedef struct {
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng);
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_clear(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng);
#endif /* SECP256K1_HASH_H */

View file

@ -171,6 +171,10 @@ static void secp256k1_sha256_initialize_tagged(secp256k1_sha256 *hash, const uns
secp256k1_sha256_write(hash, buf, 32);
}
static void secp256k1_sha256_clear(secp256k1_sha256 *hash) {
secp256k1_memclear(hash, sizeof(*hash));
}
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) {
size_t n;
unsigned char rkey[64];
@ -196,7 +200,7 @@ static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const
rkey[n] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
}
secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->inner, rkey, sizeof(rkey));
memset(rkey, 0, sizeof(rkey));
secp256k1_memclear(rkey, sizeof(rkey));
}
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_write(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, const unsigned char *data, size_t size) {
@ -207,10 +211,13 @@ static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash, unsigned
unsigned char temp[32];
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash->inner, temp);
secp256k1_sha256_write(&hash->outer, temp, 32);
memset(temp, 0, 32);
secp256k1_memclear(temp, sizeof(temp));
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&hash->outer, out32);
}
static void secp256k1_hmac_sha256_clear(secp256k1_hmac_sha256 *hash) {
secp256k1_memclear(hash, sizeof(*hash));
}
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_initialize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) {
secp256k1_hmac_sha256 hmac;
@ -274,9 +281,11 @@ static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_generate(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256
}
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_finalize(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng) {
memset(rng->k, 0, 32);
memset(rng->v, 0, 32);
rng->retry = 0;
(void) rng;
}
static void secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256_clear(secp256k1_rfc6979_hmac_sha256 *rng) {
secp256k1_memclear(rng, sizeof(*rng));
}
#undef Round

View file

@ -565,13 +565,12 @@ static void secp256k1_modinv32(secp256k1_modinv32_signed30 *x, const secp256k1_m
/* g == 0 */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&g, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 0) == 0);
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and |f|=modulus) */
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and f == modulus) */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, -1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 1) == 0 ||
(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(x, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&d, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, 9, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, 9, &modinfo->modulus, -1) == 0)));
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, 9, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0));
/* Optionally negate d, normalize to [0,modulus), and return it. */
secp256k1_modinv32_normalize_30(&d, f.v[8], modinfo);
@ -643,13 +642,12 @@ static void secp256k1_modinv32_var(secp256k1_modinv32_signed30 *x, const secp256
/* g == 0 */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&g, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 0) == 0);
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and |f|=modulus) */
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and f == modulus) */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, -1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 1) == 0 ||
(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(x, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&d, 9, &SECP256K1_SIGNED30_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
(secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) == 0)));
secp256k1_modinv32_mul_cmp_30(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0));
/* Optionally negate d, normalize to [0,modulus), and return it. */
secp256k1_modinv32_normalize_30(&d, f.v[len - 1], modinfo);

View file

@ -621,13 +621,12 @@ static void secp256k1_modinv64(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *x, const secp256k1_m
/* g == 0 */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0);
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and |f|=modulus) */
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and f == modulus) */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, -1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 1) == 0 ||
(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(x, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&d, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, -1) == 0)));
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, 5, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0));
/* Optionally negate d, normalize to [0,modulus), and return it. */
secp256k1_modinv64_normalize_62(&d, f.v[4], modinfo);
@ -698,13 +697,12 @@ static void secp256k1_modinv64_var(secp256k1_modinv64_signed62 *x, const secp256
/* g == 0 */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&g, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0);
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and |f|=modulus) */
/* |f| == 1, or (x == 0 and d == 0 and f == modulus) */
VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, -1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 1) == 0 ||
(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(x, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&d, 5, &SECP256K1_SIGNED62_ONE, 0) == 0 &&
(secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0 ||
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, -1) == 0)));
secp256k1_modinv64_mul_cmp_62(&f, len, &modinfo->modulus, 1) == 0));
/* Optionally negate d, normalize to [0,modulus), and return it. */
secp256k1_modinv64_normalize_62(&d, f.v[len - 1], modinfo);

View file

@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static int ecdh_hash_function_sha256(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, &version, 1);
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x32, 32);
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output);
secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha);
return 1;
}
@ -61,9 +62,11 @@ int secp256k1_ecdh(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *output, const se
ret = hashfp(output, x, y, data);
memset(x, 0, 32);
memset(y, 0, 32);
secp256k1_memclear(x, sizeof(x));
secp256k1_memclear(y, sizeof(y));
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s);
secp256k1_ge_clear(&pt);
secp256k1_gej_clear(&res);
return !!ret & !overflow;
}

View file

@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ static int ellswift_xdh_hash_function_prefix(unsigned char *output, const unsign
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, ell_b64, 64);
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x32, 32);
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output);
secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha);
return 1;
}
@ -539,6 +540,7 @@ static int ellswift_xdh_hash_function_bip324(unsigned char* output, const unsign
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, ell_b64, 64);
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, x32, 32);
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, output);
secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha);
return 1;
}
@ -580,7 +582,7 @@ int secp256k1_ellswift_xdh(const secp256k1_context *ctx, unsigned char *output,
/* Invoke hasher */
ret = hashfp(output, sx, ell_a64, ell_b64, data);
memset(sx, 0, 32);
secp256k1_memclear(sx, sizeof(sx));
secp256k1_fe_clear(&px);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s);

View file

@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static int nonce_function_bip340(unsigned char *nonce32, const unsigned char *ms
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, xonly_pk32, 32);
secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg, msglen);
secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, nonce32);
secp256k1_sha256_clear(&sha);
return 1;
}
@ -187,7 +188,8 @@ static int secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign_internal(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsi
secp256k1_memczero(sig64, 64, !ret);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&k);
secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sk);
memset(seckey, 0, sizeof(seckey));
secp256k1_memclear(seckey, sizeof(seckey));
secp256k1_gej_clear(&rj);
return ret;
}

View file

@ -30,13 +30,6 @@
#define SECP256K1_N_H_2 ((uint64_t)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)
#define SECP256K1_N_H_3 ((uint64_t)0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) {
r->d[0] = 0;
r->d[1] = 0;
r->d[2] = 0;
r->d[3] = 0;
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) {
r->d[0] = v;
r->d[1] = 0;

View file

@ -40,17 +40,6 @@
#define SECP256K1_N_H_6 ((uint32_t)0xFFFFFFFFUL)
#define SECP256K1_N_H_7 ((uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFFUL)
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) {
r->d[0] = 0;
r->d[1] = 0;
r->d[2] = 0;
r->d[3] = 0;
r->d[4] = 0;
r->d[5] = 0;
r->d[6] = 0;
r->d[7] = 0;
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) {
r->d[0] = v;
r->d[1] = 0;

View file

@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_one = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
static const secp256k1_scalar secp256k1_scalar_zero = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) {
secp256k1_memclear(r, sizeof(secp256k1_scalar));
}
static int secp256k1_scalar_set_b32_seckey(secp256k1_scalar *r, const unsigned char *bin) {
int overflow;
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(r, bin, &overflow);

View file

@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_scalar_is_even(const secp256k1_scalar *a)
return !(*a & 1);
}
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_clear(secp256k1_scalar *r) { *r = 0; }
SECP256K1_INLINE static void secp256k1_scalar_set_int(secp256k1_scalar *r, unsigned int v) {
*r = v % EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER;

View file

@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct {
size_t max_size;
} secp256k1_scratch;
typedef struct secp256k1_scratch_space_struct secp256k1_scratch_space;
static secp256k1_scratch* secp256k1_scratch_create(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, size_t max_size);
static void secp256k1_scratch_destroy(const secp256k1_callback* error_callback, secp256k1_scratch* scratch);

View file

@ -8,11 +8,17 @@
#define SECP256K1_UTIL_H
#include "../include/secp256k1.h"
#include "checkmem.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
/* For SecureZeroMemory */
#include <Windows.h>
#endif
#define STR_(x) #x
#define STR(x) STR_(x)
@ -215,14 +221,6 @@ SECP256K1_INLINE static int secp256k1_clz64_var(uint64_t x) {
# endif
#endif
#if defined(_WIN32)
# define I64FORMAT "I64d"
# define I64uFORMAT "I64u"
#else
# define I64FORMAT "lld"
# define I64uFORMAT "llu"
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__)
# define SECP256K1_GNUC_EXT __extension__
#else
@ -244,6 +242,34 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_memczero(void *s, size_t len, int flag) {
}
}
/* Cleanses memory to prevent leaking sensitive info. Won't be optimized out. */
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_memclear(void *ptr, size_t len) {
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
/* SecureZeroMemory is guaranteed not to be optimized out by MSVC. */
SecureZeroMemory(ptr, len);
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
/* We use a memory barrier that scares the compiler away from optimizing out the memset.
*
* Quoting Adam Langley <agl@google.com> in commit ad1907fe73334d6c696c8539646c21b11178f20f
* in BoringSSL (ISC License):
* As best as we can tell, this is sufficient to break any optimisations that
* might try to eliminate "superfluous" memsets.
* This method is used in memzero_explicit() the Linux kernel, too. Its advantage is that it
* is pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficently,
* just not remove it entirely. See "Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmful" by
* Yang et al. (USENIX Security 2017) for more background.
*/
memset(ptr, 0, len);
__asm__ __volatile__("" : : "r"(ptr) : "memory");
#else
void *(*volatile const volatile_memset)(void *, int, size_t) = memset;
volatile_memset(ptr, 0, len);
#endif
#ifdef VERIFY
SECP256K1_CHECKMEM_UNDEFINE(ptr, len);
#endif
}
/** Semantics like memcmp. Variable-time.
*
* We use this to avoid possible compiler bugs with memcmp, e.g.
@ -262,6 +288,22 @@ static SECP256K1_INLINE int secp256k1_memcmp_var(const void *s1, const void *s2,
return 0;
}
/* Return 1 if all elements of array s are 0 and otherwise return 0.
* Constant-time. */
static SECP256K1_INLINE int secp256k1_is_zero_array(const unsigned char *s, size_t len) {
unsigned char acc = 0;
int ret;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
acc |= s[i];
}
ret = (acc == 0);
/* acc may contain secret values. Try to explicitly clear it. */
secp256k1_memclear(&acc, sizeof(acc));
return ret;
}
/** If flag is true, set *r equal to *a; otherwise leave it. Constant-time. Both *r and *a must be initialized and non-negative.*/
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_int_cmov(int *r, const int *a, int flag) {
unsigned int mask0, mask1, r_masked, a_masked;

View file

@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import json
import textwrap
max_pubkeys = 0
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(
"This script converts BIP MuSig2 test vectors in a given directory to a C file that can be used in the test framework."
)
print("Usage: %s <dir>" % sys.argv[0])
sys.exit(1)
def hexstr_to_intarray(str):
return ", ".join([f"0x{b:02X}" for b in bytes.fromhex(str)])
def create_init(name):
return """
static const struct musig_%s_vector musig_%s_vector = {
""" % (
name,
name,
)
def init_array(key):
return textwrap.indent("{ %s },\n" % hexstr_to_intarray(data[key]), 4 * " ")
def init_arrays(key):
s = textwrap.indent("{\n", 4 * " ")
s += textwrap.indent(
",\n".join(["{ %s }" % hexstr_to_intarray(x) for x in data[key]]), 8 * " "
)
s += textwrap.indent("\n},\n", 4 * " ")
return s
def init_indices(array):
return " %d, { %s }" % (
len(array),
", ".join(map(str, array) if len(array) > 0 else "0"),
)
def init_is_xonly(case):
if len(case["tweak_indices"]) > 0:
return ", ".join(map(lambda x: "1" if x else "0", case["is_xonly"]))
return "0"
def init_optional_expected(case):
return hexstr_to_intarray(case["expected"]) if "expected" in case else 0
def init_cases(cases, f):
s = textwrap.indent("{\n", 4 * " ")
for (i, case) in enumerate(cases):
s += textwrap.indent("%s\n" % f(case), 8 * " ")
s += textwrap.indent("},\n", 4 * " ")
return s
def finish_init():
return "};\n"
s = (
"""/**
* Automatically generated by %s.
*
* The test vectors for the KeySort function are included in this file. They can
* be found in src/modules/extrakeys/tests_impl.h. */
"""
% sys.argv[0]
)
s += """
enum MUSIG_ERROR {
MUSIG_PUBKEY,
MUSIG_TWEAK,
MUSIG_PUBNONCE,
MUSIG_AGGNONCE,
MUSIG_SECNONCE,
MUSIG_SIG,
MUSIG_SIG_VERIFY,
MUSIG_OTHER
};
"""
# key agg vectors
with open(sys.argv[1] + "/key_agg_vectors.json", "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
max_key_indices = max(
len(test_case["key_indices"]) for test_case in data["valid_test_cases"]
)
max_tweak_indices = max(
len(test_case["tweak_indices"]) for test_case in data["error_test_cases"]
)
num_pubkeys = len(data["pubkeys"])
max_pubkeys = max(num_pubkeys, max_pubkeys)
num_tweaks = len(data["tweaks"])
num_valid_cases = len(data["valid_test_cases"])
num_error_cases = len(data["error_test_cases"])
# Add structures for valid and error cases
s += (
"""
struct musig_key_agg_valid_test_case {
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
unsigned char expected[32];
};
"""
% max_key_indices
)
s += """
struct musig_key_agg_error_test_case {
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
size_t tweak_indices_len;
size_t tweak_indices[%d];
int is_xonly[%d];
enum MUSIG_ERROR error;
};
""" % (
max_key_indices,
max_tweak_indices,
max_tweak_indices,
)
# Add structure for entire vector
s += """
struct musig_key_agg_vector {
unsigned char pubkeys[%d][33];
unsigned char tweaks[%d][32];
struct musig_key_agg_valid_test_case valid_case[%d];
struct musig_key_agg_error_test_case error_case[%d];
};
""" % (
num_pubkeys,
num_tweaks,
num_valid_cases,
num_error_cases,
)
s += create_init("key_agg")
# Add pubkeys and tweaks to the vector
s += init_arrays("pubkeys")
s += init_arrays("tweaks")
# Add valid cases to the vector
s += init_cases(
data["valid_test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ %s, { %s }},"
% (init_indices(case["key_indices"]), hexstr_to_intarray(case["expected"])),
)
def comment_to_error(case):
comment = case["comment"]
if "public key" in comment.lower():
return "MUSIG_PUBKEY"
elif "tweak" in comment.lower():
return "MUSIG_TWEAK"
else:
sys.exit("Unknown error")
# Add error cases to the vector
s += init_cases(
data["error_test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ %s, %s, { %s }, %s },"
% (
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
init_indices(case["tweak_indices"]),
init_is_xonly(case),
comment_to_error(case),
),
)
s += finish_init()
# nonce gen vectors
with open(sys.argv[1] + "/nonce_gen_vectors.json", "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
# The MuSig2 implementation only allows messages of length 32
data["test_cases"] = list(
filter(lambda c: c["msg"] is None or len(c["msg"]) == 64, data["test_cases"])
)
num_tests = len(data["test_cases"])
s += """
struct musig_nonce_gen_test_case {
unsigned char rand_[32];
int has_sk;
unsigned char sk[32];
unsigned char pk[33];
int has_aggpk;
unsigned char aggpk[32];
int has_msg;
unsigned char msg[32];
int has_extra_in;
unsigned char extra_in[32];
unsigned char expected_secnonce[97];
unsigned char expected_pubnonce[66];
};
"""
s += (
"""
struct musig_nonce_gen_vector {
struct musig_nonce_gen_test_case test_case[%d];
};
"""
% num_tests
)
s += create_init("nonce_gen")
def init_array_maybe(array):
return "%d , { %s }" % (
0 if array is None else 1,
hexstr_to_intarray(array) if array is not None else 0,
)
s += init_cases(
data["test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ { %s }, %s, { %s }, %s, %s, %s, { %s }, { %s } },"
% (
hexstr_to_intarray(case["rand_"]),
init_array_maybe(case["sk"]),
hexstr_to_intarray(case["pk"]),
init_array_maybe(case["aggpk"]),
init_array_maybe(case["msg"]),
init_array_maybe(case["extra_in"]),
hexstr_to_intarray(case["expected_secnonce"]),
hexstr_to_intarray(case["expected_pubnonce"]),
),
)
s += finish_init()
# nonce agg vectors
with open(sys.argv[1] + "/nonce_agg_vectors.json", "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
num_pnonces = len(data["pnonces"])
num_valid_cases = len(data["valid_test_cases"])
num_error_cases = len(data["error_test_cases"])
pnonce_indices_len = 2
for case in data["valid_test_cases"] + data["error_test_cases"]:
assert len(case["pnonce_indices"]) == pnonce_indices_len
# Add structures for valid and error cases
s += """
struct musig_nonce_agg_test_case {
size_t pnonce_indices[2];
/* if valid case */
unsigned char expected[66];
/* if error case */
int invalid_nonce_idx;
};
"""
# Add structure for entire vector
s += """
struct musig_nonce_agg_vector {
unsigned char pnonces[%d][66];
struct musig_nonce_agg_test_case valid_case[%d];
struct musig_nonce_agg_test_case error_case[%d];
};
""" % (
num_pnonces,
num_valid_cases,
num_error_cases,
)
s += create_init("nonce_agg")
s += init_arrays("pnonces")
for cases in (data["valid_test_cases"], data["error_test_cases"]):
s += init_cases(
cases,
lambda case: "{ { %s }, { %s }, %d },"
% (
", ".join(map(str, case["pnonce_indices"])),
init_optional_expected(case),
case["error"]["signer"] if "error" in case else 0,
),
)
s += finish_init()
# sign/verify vectors
with open(sys.argv[1] + "/sign_verify_vectors.json", "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
# The MuSig2 implementation only allows messages of length 32
assert list(filter(lambda x: len(x) == 64, data["msgs"]))[0] == data["msgs"][0]
data["msgs"] = [data["msgs"][0]]
def filter_msg32(k):
return list(filter(lambda x: x["msg_index"] == 0, data[k]))
data["valid_test_cases"] = filter_msg32("valid_test_cases")
data["sign_error_test_cases"] = filter_msg32("sign_error_test_cases")
data["verify_error_test_cases"] = filter_msg32("verify_error_test_cases")
data["verify_fail_test_cases"] = filter_msg32("verify_fail_test_cases")
num_pubkeys = len(data["pubkeys"])
max_pubkeys = max(num_pubkeys, max_pubkeys)
num_secnonces = len(data["secnonces"])
num_pubnonces = len(data["pnonces"])
num_aggnonces = len(data["aggnonces"])
num_msgs = len(data["msgs"])
num_valid_cases = len(data["valid_test_cases"])
num_sign_error_cases = len(data["sign_error_test_cases"])
num_verify_fail_cases = len(data["verify_fail_test_cases"])
num_verify_error_cases = len(data["verify_error_test_cases"])
all_cases = (
data["valid_test_cases"]
+ data["sign_error_test_cases"]
+ data["verify_error_test_cases"]
+ data["verify_fail_test_cases"]
)
max_key_indices = max(len(test_case["key_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
max_nonce_indices = max(
len(test_case["nonce_indices"]) if "nonce_indices" in test_case else 0
for test_case in all_cases
)
# Add structures for valid and error cases
s += (
"""
/* Omit pubnonces in the test vectors because our partial signature verification
* implementation is able to accept the aggnonce directly. */
struct musig_valid_case {
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
size_t aggnonce_index;
size_t msg_index;
size_t signer_index;
unsigned char expected[32];
};
"""
% max_key_indices
)
s += (
"""
struct musig_sign_error_case {
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
size_t aggnonce_index;
size_t msg_index;
size_t secnonce_index;
enum MUSIG_ERROR error;
};
"""
% max_key_indices
)
s += """
struct musig_verify_fail_error_case {
unsigned char sig[32];
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
size_t nonce_indices_len;
size_t nonce_indices[%d];
size_t msg_index;
size_t signer_index;
enum MUSIG_ERROR error;
};
""" % (
max_key_indices,
max_nonce_indices,
)
# Add structure for entire vector
s += """
struct musig_sign_verify_vector {
unsigned char sk[32];
unsigned char pubkeys[%d][33];
unsigned char secnonces[%d][194];
unsigned char pubnonces[%d][194];
unsigned char aggnonces[%d][66];
unsigned char msgs[%d][32];
struct musig_valid_case valid_case[%d];
struct musig_sign_error_case sign_error_case[%d];
struct musig_verify_fail_error_case verify_fail_case[%d];
struct musig_verify_fail_error_case verify_error_case[%d];
};
""" % (
num_pubkeys,
num_secnonces,
num_pubnonces,
num_aggnonces,
num_msgs,
num_valid_cases,
num_sign_error_cases,
num_verify_fail_cases,
num_verify_error_cases,
)
s += create_init("sign_verify")
s += init_array("sk")
s += init_arrays("pubkeys")
s += init_arrays("secnonces")
s += init_arrays("pnonces")
s += init_arrays("aggnonces")
s += init_arrays("msgs")
s += init_cases(
data["valid_test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ %s, %d, %d, %d, { %s }},"
% (
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
case["aggnonce_index"],
case["msg_index"],
case["signer_index"],
init_optional_expected(case),
),
)
def sign_error(case):
comment = case["comment"]
if "pubkey" in comment or "public key" in comment:
return "MUSIG_PUBKEY"
elif "Aggregate nonce" in comment:
return "MUSIG_AGGNONCE"
elif "Secnonce" in comment:
return "MUSIG_SECNONCE"
else:
sys.exit("Unknown sign error")
s += init_cases(
data["sign_error_test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ %s, %d, %d, %d, %s },"
% (
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
case["aggnonce_index"],
case["msg_index"],
case["secnonce_index"],
sign_error(case),
),
)
def verify_error(case):
comment = case["comment"]
if "exceeds" in comment:
return "MUSIG_SIG"
elif "Wrong signer" in comment or "Wrong signature" in comment:
return "MUSIG_SIG_VERIFY"
elif "pubnonce" in comment:
return "MUSIG_PUBNONCE"
elif "pubkey" in comment:
return "MUSIG_PUBKEY"
else:
sys.exit("Unknown verify error")
for cases in ("verify_fail_test_cases", "verify_error_test_cases"):
s += init_cases(
data[cases],
lambda case: "{ { %s }, %s, %s, %d, %d, %s },"
% (
hexstr_to_intarray(case["sig"]),
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
init_indices(case["nonce_indices"]),
case["msg_index"],
case["signer_index"],
verify_error(case),
),
)
s += finish_init()
# tweak vectors
with open(sys.argv[1] + "/tweak_vectors.json", "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
num_pubkeys = len(data["pubkeys"])
max_pubkeys = max(num_pubkeys, max_pubkeys)
num_pubnonces = len(data["pnonces"])
num_tweaks = len(data["tweaks"])
num_valid_cases = len(data["valid_test_cases"])
num_error_cases = len(data["error_test_cases"])
all_cases = data["valid_test_cases"] + data["error_test_cases"]
max_key_indices = max(len(test_case["key_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
max_tweak_indices = max(len(test_case["tweak_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
max_nonce_indices = max(len(test_case["nonce_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
# Add structures for valid and error cases
s += """
struct musig_tweak_case {
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
size_t nonce_indices_len;
size_t nonce_indices[%d];
size_t tweak_indices_len;
size_t tweak_indices[%d];
int is_xonly[%d];
size_t signer_index;
unsigned char expected[32];
};
""" % (
max_key_indices,
max_nonce_indices,
max_tweak_indices,
max_tweak_indices,
)
# Add structure for entire vector
s += """
struct musig_tweak_vector {
unsigned char sk[32];
unsigned char secnonce[97];
unsigned char aggnonce[66];
unsigned char msg[32];
unsigned char pubkeys[%d][33];
unsigned char pubnonces[%d][194];
unsigned char tweaks[%d][32];
struct musig_tweak_case valid_case[%d];
struct musig_tweak_case error_case[%d];
};
""" % (
num_pubkeys,
num_pubnonces,
num_tweaks,
num_valid_cases,
num_error_cases,
)
s += create_init("tweak")
s += init_array("sk")
s += init_array("secnonce")
s += init_array("aggnonce")
s += init_array("msg")
s += init_arrays("pubkeys")
s += init_arrays("pnonces")
s += init_arrays("tweaks")
s += init_cases(
data["valid_test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ %s, %s, %s, { %s }, %d, { %s }},"
% (
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
init_indices(case["nonce_indices"]),
init_indices(case["tweak_indices"]),
init_is_xonly(case),
case["signer_index"],
init_optional_expected(case),
),
)
s += init_cases(
data["error_test_cases"],
lambda case: "{ %s, %s, %s, { %s }, %d, { %s }},"
% (
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
init_indices(case["nonce_indices"]),
init_indices(case["tweak_indices"]),
init_is_xonly(case),
case["signer_index"],
init_optional_expected(case),
),
)
s += finish_init()
# sigagg vectors
with open(sys.argv[1] + "/sig_agg_vectors.json", "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
num_pubkeys = len(data["pubkeys"])
max_pubkeys = max(num_pubkeys, max_pubkeys)
num_tweaks = len(data["tweaks"])
num_psigs = len(data["psigs"])
num_valid_cases = len(data["valid_test_cases"])
num_error_cases = len(data["error_test_cases"])
all_cases = data["valid_test_cases"] + data["error_test_cases"]
max_key_indices = max(len(test_case["key_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
max_tweak_indices = max(len(test_case["tweak_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
max_psig_indices = max(len(test_case["psig_indices"]) for test_case in all_cases)
# Add structures for valid and error cases
s += """
/* Omit pubnonces in the test vectors because they're only needed for
* implementations that do not directly accept an aggnonce. */
struct musig_sig_agg_case {
size_t key_indices_len;
size_t key_indices[%d];
size_t tweak_indices_len;
size_t tweak_indices[%d];
int is_xonly[%d];
unsigned char aggnonce[66];
size_t psig_indices_len;
size_t psig_indices[%d];
/* if valid case */
unsigned char expected[64];
/* if error case */
int invalid_sig_idx;
};
""" % (
max_key_indices,
max_tweak_indices,
max_tweak_indices,
max_psig_indices,
)
# Add structure for entire vector
s += """
struct musig_sig_agg_vector {
unsigned char pubkeys[%d][33];
unsigned char tweaks[%d][32];
unsigned char psigs[%d][32];
unsigned char msg[32];
struct musig_sig_agg_case valid_case[%d];
struct musig_sig_agg_case error_case[%d];
};
""" % (
num_pubkeys,
num_tweaks,
num_psigs,
num_valid_cases,
num_error_cases,
)
s += create_init("sig_agg")
s += init_arrays("pubkeys")
s += init_arrays("tweaks")
s += init_arrays("psigs")
s += init_array("msg")
for cases in (data["valid_test_cases"], data["error_test_cases"]):
s += init_cases(
cases,
lambda case: "{ %s, %s, { %s }, { %s }, %s, { %s }, %d },"
% (
init_indices(case["key_indices"]),
init_indices(case["tweak_indices"]),
init_is_xonly(case),
hexstr_to_intarray(case["aggnonce"]),
init_indices(case["psig_indices"]),
init_optional_expected(case),
case["error"]["signer"] if "error" in case else 0,
),
)
s += finish_init()
s += "enum { MUSIG_VECTORS_MAX_PUBKEYS = %d };" % max_pubkeys
print(s)