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Multithreaded amount commitment and range proof checking

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instagibbs 2016-07-06 12:06:55 +02:00 • committed by Gregory Sanders
parent 56aa82fc2d
commit 33609ed3ea
4 changed files with 140 additions and 67 deletions
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128
src/main.cpp
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@ -1122,10 +1122,9 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state)
return true;
}
//static Secp256k1Ctx init_context_on_load;
//extern secp256k1_context* secp256k1_bitcoin_verify_context;
namespace {
static secp256k1_context* secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts = NULL;
static secp256k1_context* secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts;
class Secp256k1Ctx
{
@ -1144,12 +1143,86 @@ public:
secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts = NULL;
}
};
static Secp256k1Ctx instance_of_secp256k1ctx;
bool VerifyAmounts(const CCoinsViewCache& cache, const CTransaction& tx, const CAmount& excess)
/** Closure representing one output range check. */
class CRangeCheck : public CCheck
{
private:
const CTxOutValue* val;
public:
CRangeCheck(const CTxOutValue* val_) : val(val_) {}
bool operator()();
};
/** Closure representing a transaction amount balance check. */
class CBalanceCheck : public CCheck
{
private:
std::vector<unsigned char> vchData;
std::vector<unsigned char *> vpchCommitsIn, vpchCommitsOut;
CAmount nPlainAmount;
public:
CBalanceCheck(std::vector<unsigned char>& vchData_, std::vector<unsigned char*>& vpchCommitsIn_, std::vector<unsigned char*>& vpchCommitsOut_, const CAmount& nPlainAmount_) : nPlainAmount(nPlainAmount_) {
vchData.swap(vchData_);
vpchCommitsIn.swap(vpchCommitsIn_);
vpchCommitsOut.swap(vpchCommitsOut_);
}
bool operator()();
};
// Destroys check, or passes its ownership to the queue.
static inline bool QueueCheck(std::vector<CCheck*>* queue, CCheck* check)
{
if (queue != NULL) {
queue->push_back(check);
return true;
}
bool ret = (*check)();
delete check;
return ret;
}
bool CRangeCheck::operator()()
{
if (val->IsAmount()) {
return true;
}
uint64_t min_value, max_value;
if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts, &min_value, &max_value, &val->vchCommitment[0], val->vchRangeproof.data(), val->vchRangeproof.size())) {
fAmountError = true;
return false;
}
return true;
};
bool CBalanceCheck::operator()()
{
if (!secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts, vpchCommitsIn.data(), vpchCommitsIn.size(), vpchCommitsOut.data(), vpchCommitsOut.size(), nPlainAmount)) {
fAmountError = true;
return false;
}
return true;
}
} // namespace
bool VerifyAmounts(const CCoinsViewCache& cache, const CTransaction& tx, const CAmount& excess, std::vector<CCheck*>* pvChecks)
{
bool fNeedNoRangeProof = false;
CAmount nPlainAmount = excess;
{
std::vector<unsigned char> vchData;
std::vector<unsigned char *> vpchCommitsIn, vpchCommitsOut;
bool fNullRangeproof = false;
@ -1200,21 +1273,25 @@ bool VerifyAmounts(const CCoinsViewCache& cache, const CTransaction& tx, const C
if (vpchCommitsIn.size() + vpchCommitsOut.size() == 0)
return (nPlainAmount == 0);
if (!secp256k1_pedersen_verify_tally(secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts, vpchCommitsIn.data(), vpchCommitsIn.size(), vpchCommitsOut.data(), vpchCommitsOut.size(), nPlainAmount))
fNeedNoRangeProof = ((!vpchCommitsIn.empty()) && vpchCommitsOut.size() == 1 && nPlainAmount <= 0 && fNullRangeproof);
if (!QueueCheck(pvChecks, new CBalanceCheck(vchData, vpchCommitsIn, vpchCommitsOut, nPlainAmount))) {
return false;
}
}
// Rangeproof is optional in this case
if ((!vpchCommitsIn.empty()) && vpchCommitsOut.size() == 1 && nPlainAmount <= 0 && fNullRangeproof)
if (fNeedNoRangeProof)
return true;
uint64_t min_value, max_value;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
const CTxOutValue& val = tx.vout[i].nValue;
if (val.IsAmount())
continue;
if (!secp256k1_rangeproof_verify(secp256k1_ctx_verify_amounts, &min_value, &max_value, &val.vchCommitment[0], val.vchRangeproof.data(), val.vchRangeproof.size()))
if (!QueueCheck(pvChecks, new CRangeCheck(&val))) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
@ -2211,7 +2288,7 @@ int GetSpendHeight(const CCoinsViewCache& inputs)
}
namespace Consensus {
bool CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, int nSpendHeight, std::set<std::pair<uint256, COutPoint> >& setWithdrawsSpent)
bool CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, int nSpendHeight, std::set<std::pair<uint256, COutPoint> >& setWithdrawsSpent, std::vector<CCheck*> *pvChecks)
{
// This doesn't trigger the DoS code on purpose; if it did, it would make it easier
// for an attacker to attempt to split the network.
@ -2259,7 +2336,7 @@ bool CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, const CCoins
if (!MoneyRange(nTxFee))
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
if (!VerifyAmounts(inputs, tx, nTxFee))
if (!VerifyAmounts(inputs, tx, nTxFee, pvChecks))
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false,
strprintf("value in (%s) < value out", FormatMoney(nValueIn)));
@ -2267,11 +2344,11 @@ bool CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, const CCoins
}
}// namespace Consensus
bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, bool fScriptChecks, unsigned int flags, bool cacheStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, set<pair<uint256, COutPoint> >& setWithdrawsSpent, std::vector<CScriptCheck> *pvChecks)
bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, bool fScriptChecks, unsigned int flags, bool cacheStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, set<pair<uint256, COutPoint> >& setWithdrawsSpent, std::vector<CCheck*> *pvChecks)
{
if (!tx.IsCoinBase())
{
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, inputs, GetSpendHeight(inputs), setWithdrawsSpent))
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, inputs, GetSpendHeight(inputs), setWithdrawsSpent, pvChecks))
return false;
if (pvChecks)
@ -2295,11 +2372,8 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
assert(coins);
// Verify signature
CScriptCheck check(*coins, tx, i, prevValueIn, flags, cacheStore, &txdata);
if (pvChecks) {
pvChecks->push_back(CScriptCheck());
check.swap(pvChecks->back());
} else if (!check()) {
CCheck* check = new CScriptCheck(*coins, tx, i, prevValueIn, flags, cacheStore, &txdata);
if (!QueueCheck(pvChecks, check)) {
if (flags & STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS) {
// Check whether the failure was caused by a
// non-mandatory script verification check, such as
@ -2310,7 +2384,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
CScriptCheck check2(*coins, tx, i, prevValueIn,
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheStore, &txdata);
if (check2())
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check->GetScriptError())));
}
// Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is
// invalid in new blocks, e.g. a invalid P2SH. We DoS ban
@ -2319,10 +2393,10 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
// as to the correct behavior - we may want to continue
// peering with non-upgraded nodes even after soft-fork
// super-majority signaling has occurred.
if (check.GetScriptError() == SCRIPT_ERR_WITHDRAW_VERIFY_BLOCKCONFIRMED)
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_SCRIPT, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
if (check->GetScriptError() == SCRIPT_ERR_WITHDRAW_VERIFY_BLOCKCONFIRMED)
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_SCRIPT, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check->GetScriptError())));
else
return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check->GetScriptError())));
}
const CTxOutValue& value = coins->vout[tx.vin[i].prevout.n].nValue;
if (value.IsAmount())
@ -2554,7 +2628,7 @@ void static FlushBlockFile(bool fFinalize = false)
bool FindUndoPos(CValidationState &state, int nFile, CDiskBlockPos &pos, unsigned int nAddSize);
static CCheckQueue<CScriptCheck> scriptcheckqueue(128);
static CCheckQueue<CCheck> scriptcheckqueue(128);
void ThreadScriptCheck() {
RenameThread("bitcoin-scriptch");
@ -2838,7 +2912,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
CBlockUndo blockundo;
CCheckQueueControl<CScriptCheck> control(fScriptChecks && nScriptCheckThreads ? &scriptcheckqueue : NULL);
CCheckQueueControl<CCheck> control(fScriptChecks && nScriptCheckThreads ? &scriptcheckqueue : NULL);
std::vector<uint256> vOrphanErase;
std::vector<int> prevheights;
@ -2908,7 +2982,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
if (!MoneyRange(nFees))
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): total tx fee overflowed"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks;
std::vector<CCheck*> vChecks;
bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */
if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, txdata[i], setWithdrawsSpent == NULL ? setWithdrawsSpentDummy : *setWithdrawsSpent, nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : NULL))
return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s",
@ -2937,7 +3011,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus());
if (!MoneyRange(blockReward))
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): total block reward overflowed"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blockreward-outofrange");
if (VerifyAmounts(view, block.vtx[0], -blockReward))
if (!VerifyAmounts(view, block.vtx[0], -blockReward))
return state.DoS(100,
error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (limit=%d)",
blockReward),