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Merge d7d7d31506 into merged_master (Bitcoin PR #15141)

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This commit is contained in:
Andrew Poelstra 2020-10-29 02:10:39 +00:00
commit 2d57dcb681
9 changed files with 343 additions and 241 deletions
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199
src/validation.cpp
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@ -602,28 +602,28 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase");
// Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest)
std::string reason;
if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason))
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason);
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason);
// Do not work on transactions that are too small.
// A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes.
// Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to reduce unnecessary malloc overhead.
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE)
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small");
// Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
// be mined yet.
if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS))
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
// is it already in the memory pool?
if (pool.exists(hash)) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool");
}
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
}
}
if (fReplacementOptOut) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict");
}
setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Note that the witness vector must be size 0 or len(vin)
if (!tx.witness.vtxinwit.empty() &&
!tx.witness.vtxinwit[input_index].m_pegin_witness.IsNull()) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_PEGIN, "extra-pegin-witness");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_PEGIN, "extra-pegin-witness");
}
}
}
@ -706,13 +706,13 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
tx.witness.vtxinwit[i].m_pegin_witness.stack.size() < 6 ||
uint256(tx.witness.vtxinwit[i].m_pegin_witness.stack[2]).IsNull() ||
tx.vin[i].prevout.hash.IsNull()) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "pegin-no-witness");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "pegin-no-witness");
}
std::pair<uint256, COutPoint> pegin = std::make_pair(uint256(tx.witness.vtxinwit[i].m_pegin_witness.stack[2]), tx.vin[i].prevout);
// This assumes non-null prevout and genesis block hash
if (view.IsPeginSpent(pegin)) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "pegin-already-claimed");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "pegin-already-claimed");
}
continue;
}
@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
// Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
if (pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
}
}
// Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
// CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
if (!CheckSequenceLocks(pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
CAmountMap fee_map;
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, GetSpendHeight(view), fee_map, setPeginsSpent, NULL, true, true)) {
@ -761,11 +761,11 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, view))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
// Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, view))
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard", true);
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
@ -795,27 +795,22 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lp, setPeginsSpent);
unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize();
// Check that the transaction doesn't have an excessive number of
// sigops, making it impossible to mine. Since the coinbase transaction
// itself can contain sigops MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS is less than
// MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS; we still consider this an invalid rather than
// merely non-standard transaction.
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize);
if (!bypass_limits && mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) {
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee));
}
// No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected blocks
if (!bypass_limits && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) {
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)));
}
if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
return state.Invalid(false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee",
strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
@ -827,7 +822,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
std::string errString;
if (!pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) {
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", false, errString);
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
}
// A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now
@ -839,8 +834,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
{
return state.DoS(10, false,
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
hash.ToString(),
hashAncestor.ToString()));
@ -882,8 +876,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
{
return state.DoS(0, false,
REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
hash.ToString(),
newFeeRate.ToString(),
@ -911,8 +904,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
}
} else {
return state.DoS(0, false,
REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
hash.ToString(),
nConflictingCount,
@ -931,8 +923,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
// tx that's in the mempool.
if (pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
return state.DoS(0, false,
REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
hash.ToString(), j));
}
@ -944,8 +935,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// transactions would not be paid for.
if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
{
return state.DoS(0, false,
REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
}
@ -955,8 +945,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
{
return state.DoS(0, false,
REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false,
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(),
FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
@ -974,12 +963,13 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// need to turn both off, and compare against just turning off CLEANSTACK
// to see if the failure is specifically due to witness validation.
CValidationState stateDummy; // Want reported failures to be from first CheckInputs
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata)) {
if (!CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
state.SetCorruptionPossible();
}
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
!CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason()));
return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
}
@ -1036,7 +1026,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
if (!bypass_limits) {
LimitMempoolSize(pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60);
if (!pool.exists(hash))
return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
}
}
@ -1377,7 +1367,7 @@ void static InvalidChainFound(CBlockIndex* pindexNew) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(c
}
void CChainState::InvalidBlockFound(CBlockIndex *pindex, const CValidationState &state) {
if (!state.CorruptionPossible()) {
if (state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
m_failed_blocks.insert(pindex);
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex);
@ -1454,6 +1444,9 @@ void InitScriptExecutionCache() {
* which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks where we will likely never need the cache
* entry again.
*
* Note that we may set state.reason to NOT_STANDARD for extra soft-fork flags in flags, block-checking
* callers should probably reset it to CONSENSUS in such cases.
*
* Non-static (and re-declared) in src/test/txvalidationcache_tests.cpp
*/
bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, bool fScriptChecks, unsigned int flags, bool cacheSigStore, bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, std::vector<CCheck*> *pvChecks) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main)
@ -1516,23 +1509,27 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
// Check whether the failure was caused by a
// non-mandatory script verification check, such as
// non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy
// arguments; if so, don't trigger DoS protection to
// avoid splitting the network between upgraded and
// non-upgraded nodes.
// arguments; if so, ensure we return NOT_STANDARD
// instead of CONSENSUS to avoid downstream users
// splitting the network between upgraded and
// non-upgraded nodes by banning CONSENSUS-failing
// data providers.
CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i,
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
if (check2()) {
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(serror)));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(serror)));
}
}
// Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is
// invalid in new blocks, e.g. an invalid P2SH. We DoS ban
// such nodes as they are not following the protocol. That
// said during an upgrade careful thought should be taken
// as to the correct behavior - we may want to continue
// peering with non-upgraded nodes even after soft-fork
// super-majority signaling has occurred.
return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(serror)));
// MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
// ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS
// failures are the most serious case of validation
// failures, we may need to consider using
// RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE for any script failure that
// could be due to non-upgraded nodes which we may want to
// support, to avoid splitting the network (but this
// depends on the details of how net_processing handles
// such errors).
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(serror)));
}
}
@ -1943,7 +1940,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
// re-enforce that rule here (at least until we make it impossible for
// GetAdjustedTime() to go backward).
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(), !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck)) {
if (state.CorruptionPossible()) {
if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
// We don't write down blocks to disk if they may have been
// corrupted, so this should be impossible unless we're having hardware
// problems.
@ -1960,7 +1957,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
for (auto& txout : block.vtx[0]->vout) {
bool mustPay = !txout.nValue.IsExplicit() || txout.nValue.GetAmount() != 0;
if (mustPay && txout.scriptPubKey != mandatory_coinbase_destination) {
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): Coinbase outputs didn't match required scriptPubKey"),
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): Coinbase outputs didn't match required scriptPubKey"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-coinbase-txos");
}
}
@ -2079,7 +2076,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"),
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-BIP30");
}
}
@ -2127,12 +2124,20 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, pindex->nHeight, fee_map,
setPeginsSpent == NULL ? setPeginsSpentDummy : *setPeginsSpent,
nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : NULL, fCacheResults, fScriptChecks)) {
if (!IsBlockReason(state.GetReason())) {
// CheckTxInputs may return MISSING_INPUTS or
// PREMATURE_SPEND but we can't return that, as it's not
// defined for a block, so we reset the reason flag to
// CONSENSUS here.
state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
control.Add(vChecks);
if (!MoneyRange(fee_map))
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): total block reward overflowed"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blockreward-outofrange");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): total block reward overflowed"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blockreward-outofrange");
// Check that transaction is BIP68 final
// BIP68 lock checks (as opposed to nLockTime checks) must
@ -2147,7 +2152,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
}
if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) {
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__),
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
}
}
@ -2158,7 +2163,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
// * witness (when witness enabled in flags and excludes coinbase)
nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags);
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"),
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops");
txdata.emplace_back(tx);
@ -2166,9 +2171,20 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
{
std::vector<CCheck*> vChecks;
bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */
if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr))
if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) {
if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD) {
// CheckInputs may return NOT_STANDARD for extra flags we passed,
// but we can't return that, as it's not defined for a block, so
// we reset the reason flag to CONSENSUS here.
// In the event of a future soft-fork, we may need to
// consider whether rewriting to CONSENSUS or
// RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE would be more appropriate.
state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
}
return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s",
tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
control.Add(vChecks);
}
@ -2185,14 +2201,14 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
CAmountMap block_reward = fee_map;
block_reward[consensusParams.subsidy_asset] += GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, consensusParams);
if (!MoneyRange(block_reward))
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): total block reward overflowed"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blockreward-outofrange");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): total block reward overflowed"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blockreward-outofrange");
if (!VerifyCoinbaseAmount(*(block.vtx[0]), block_reward)) {
return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (limit=%d)",
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (limit=%d)",
block_reward[consensusParams.subsidy_asset]), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-amount");
}
if (!control.Wait())
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed");
int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
@ -2765,7 +2781,7 @@ bool CChainState::ActivateBestChainStep(CValidationState& state, const CChainPar
if (!ConnectTip(state, chainparams, pindexConnect, pindexConnect == pindexMostWork ? pblock : std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>(), connectTrace, disconnectpool)) {
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
// The block violates a consensus rule.
if (!state.CorruptionPossible()) {
if (state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
InvalidChainFound(vpindexToConnect.front());
}
state = CValidationState();
@ -3264,7 +3280,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state,
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (fCheckPOW && block.GetHash() != consensusParams.hashGenesisBlock
&& !CheckProof(block, consensusParams)) {
return state.DoS(50, false, REJECT_INVALID, g_signed_blocks ? "block-proof-invalid" : "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, g_signed_blocks ? "block-proof-invalid" : "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
}
return true;
}
@ -3286,13 +3302,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
bool mutated;
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
// while still invalidating it.
if (mutated)
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
}
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@ -3303,19 +3319,19 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
// Size limits
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase())
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
// Check transactions
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx)
if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, state, true))
return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage()));
unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
@ -3324,7 +3340,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx);
}
if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
block.fChecked = true;
@ -3513,7 +3529,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// Check proof of work if necessary
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
if (!CheckChallenge(block, *pindexPrev, consensusParams))
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
// Check against checkpoints
if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
@ -3522,28 +3538,28 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// MapBlockIndex.
CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints());
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight)
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
}
// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
// Check height in header against prev
if (g_con_blockheightinheader && (uint32_t)nHeight != block.block_height)
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block height in header is incorrect", __func__),
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, error("%s: block height in header is incorrect", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-header-height");
// Check timestamp
if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME)
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
// Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
// check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
return true;
@ -3573,7 +3589,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// Check that all transactions are finalized
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
}
}
@ -3583,7 +3599,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
}
}
@ -3593,7 +3609,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
if (!inwit.vchIssuanceAmountRangeproof.empty() ||
!inwit.vchInflationKeysRangeproof.empty() ||
!inwit.m_pegin_witness.IsNull()) {
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-witness", true, "Coinbase has invalid input witness data.");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-witness", "Coinbase has invalid input witness data.");
}
}
@ -3617,12 +3633,12 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
if ((block.vtx[0]->witness.vtxinwit.empty()) ||
(block.vtx[0]->witness.vtxinwit[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1) ||
(block.vtx[0]->witness.vtxinwit[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32)) {
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", true, strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
}
CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->witness.vtxinwit[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin());
uint256 committedWitness(std::vector<unsigned char>(&block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6+32]));
if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", true, strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch: calculated: %s found commitment: %s", __func__, hashWitness.GetHex(), committedWitness.GetHex()));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
}
fHaveWitness = true;
}
@ -3632,7 +3648,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
if (!fHaveWitness) {
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", true, strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
}
}
}
@ -3644,7 +3660,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently
// failed).
if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) {
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", false, strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
}
return true;
@ -3664,7 +3680,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState&
if (ppindex)
*ppindex = pindex;
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK)
return state.Invalid(error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID, error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate");
return true;
}
@ -3675,10 +3691,10 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState&
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr;
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(block.hashPrevBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
return state.DoS(10, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found");
pindexPrev = (*mi).second;
if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK)
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime()))
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
@ -3715,7 +3731,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState&
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(invalid_walk);
invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
}
return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
}
}
}
@ -3820,7 +3836,8 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, CVali
if (chainparams.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock != block.GetHash() &&
(!CheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus()) ||
!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(), pindex->pprev))) {
if (state.IsInvalid() && !state.CorruptionPossible()) {
assert(IsBlockReason(state.GetReason()));
if (state.IsInvalid() && state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex);
}